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Summary 
The petroleum industry is constantly moving further north on the NCS, where oil and gas 
operators are facing new challenges in more complex environments. The ability to respond 
quickly in crisis situations is important both economically and socially. Oil platforms are a 
central and important part of the Norwegian infrastructure, where activities both onshore and 
offshore represent a large part of the Norwegian economy and are sensitive targets and 
legitimate goals for terrorist and violent extremists. New terror attacks and regulations in the 
past years have created national and regional discussions, which calls for oil companies to 
strengthen their preparedness system dealing with terrorist threats. This has created new 
demands of upgrading and improving the preparedness system and security strategies.  
This paper examines what measures to be done by the national preparedness system and the 
oil companies and their 2nd line preparedness teams to strengthen their preparedness and 
security against terror threats in the Barents Sea. Our research question is as following:  
“How should the managerial roles within the 2nd line preparedness team be 
strengthened to handle terror threats in the Barents Sea?” 
Companies in the petroleum industry faces challenges related to security and preparedness of 
offshore installations in the Barents Sea such as: lack of resources, long respond time, long 
distances, harsh weather conditions, communication and cooperation difficulties between a 
highly number of participants, lack of full-scale practices and lack of knowledge and 
experience handling terror threat situations. One way of meeting these challenges is to 
strengthen the 2nd line preparedness team within the oil companies. The preparedness team 
consists of several managerial roles that are responsible of assisting the 1st line preparedness 
team located on the platform. The managerial roles within the 2nd line are responsible of the 
following areas during a crisis situation: handling the media, contacting the authority, 
protecting the environment, contact with the rig team, logistic and resources assistant and 
allocation, ensuring personnel care and an action manager managing the whole preparedness 
team. It is limited what changes that can be done within the 2nd line preparedness team to 
strengthen the preparedness against terror attacks in the Barents Sea without strengthening the 
oil companies preparedness system and the national preparedness system. It is therefore 
needed to examine what changes that can be done within these two preparedness systems to 
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strengthen the performance of the 2nd line preparedness during a terror threat situation in the 
Barents Sea.  
 The main findings in study show that the 2nd preparedness team should establish two new 
managerial roles: 1) Expertise of handling terror threat situation and 2) Local and regional 
expertise handling crisis situations in the Barents Sea. Due to the complex environment and 
the high number of preparedness participants full-scale exercises should be held in the 
Barents Sea region more frequently practicing on different terror attack scenarios. A clear and 
common terror threat picture between the oil companies and the authorities needs to be in 
place to implement necessary measures such as: physical security of installations, increased 
regional resources and improved infrastructure to prevent and prepare for terror attacks in the 
Barents Sea.  
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Sammendrag  
Petroleumsnæringen beveger seg stadig lengre nord på den norske sokkelen, noe som fører til 
at olje og gass selskapene står ovenfor stadig nye utfordringer i mer komplekse omgivelser. 
Evnen til å reagere raskt under krisesituasjoner er nødvendig både på grunn av økonomiske og 
sosiale grunner. Oljeindustrien i Norge representerer en sentral del av den norske 
verdiskapningen hvor offshore oljeinstallasjoner vil være potensielle terror mål for terrorister 
og voldelige ekstremister. Tidligere terror angrep har skapt nasjonale og regionale 
diskusjoner, og det er et behov fra oljeselskapene sin side å styrke sitt beredskapssystem for å 
håndtere terror trusler. Dette har ført til nye krav om oppgradering og forbedring av 
beredskapssystemet og sikkerhetsstrategier.  
Denne oppgaven undersøker hvilke tiltak som må gjøres innen det nasjonale 
beredskapssystemet og av oljeselskapene for å styrke beredskapen og sikkerhet av olje 
installasjoner mot terrortrusler i Barentshavet.  
Vår problemstilling er som følgende:   
”Hvordan skal lederrollene i andrelinje beredskapen styrkes for å kunne håndtere 
terror trusler i Barentshavet?” 
Petroleumsindustrien står ovenfor utfordringer knyttet til sikring og beredskap på 
oljeinstallasjoner offshore hvor det er en mangel på ressurser, lang respons tid, store 
avstander, vanskelige vær forhold, samarbeid og kommunikasjonsvanskeligheter mellom 
mange beredskapsaktører, mangel på fullskala øvelser og kunnskap og erfaring med å 
håndtere terror situasjoner. En måte å møte disse utfordringene på er å styrke oljeselskapenes 
andrelinje beredskapsteam. Andrelinje beredskapsteamet består av flere lederroller som er 
ansvarlig med å bistå førstelinje beredskapsteam på olje plattformene. Lederrollene innen 
andrelinje teamet er ansvarlige for følgende områder under en krisesituasjon: media 
håndtering, kontakt med myndighetene, beskytte miljøet, kontaktpunkt med ulykkesstedet, 
fordele og skaffe nødvendige ressurser, sikre personell og i tillegg hvor det er en overordnede 
som har ansvar for å lede beredskapsteamet. Det er begrenset hvilke endringer som kan gjøres 
i andrelinje for å styrke beredskapen rettet mot terrorangrep i Barentshavet uten å se på 
hvordan oljeselskapenes beredskapssystem og det nasjonale beredskapssystemet kan styrkes. 
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Det er derfor nødvendig å undersøke hvilke endringer som kan gjøres innen disse områdene 
for å styrke kapasiteten til andrelinje beredskap under en terrorsituasjon i Barentshavet.  
De viktigste funnene i denne oppgaven er at andrelinje beredskap bør etablere to nye 
lederroller. Den først med kompetanse til å håndtere terrortrussel og den andre med lokal og 
regional kompetanse for å håndtere krisesituasjoner i Barentshavet. Barentshavet befinner seg 
i et kompleks miljø hvor terror beredskapssituasjoner krever deltakelse fra et høyt antall 
aktører. Det bør derfor holdes flere ”fullskala øvelser” i Barentshavet der alle aktørene som 
deltar under en terror krisesituasjon er med. Det er også behov for å etablere en sterkere felles 
forståelse av terrortrussel bildet i Barentshavet mellom oljeselskapene og myndighetene. Et 
samlet trusselbildet vil gjøre forbedringsprosessen av beredskapssystemet lettere hvor man ser 
de samme behovene for fysisk sikring av installasjoner, økt ressurs behov og forbedring av 
infrastrukturen i Barentshavet for å håndtere terror angrep.   
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Terms and definitions  
Adverse events can be used as a generic term for all types of accidents, crisis disasters etc. 
These are events that derivate from the normal, and there are actions to prevent and limit the 
damage of an adverse event (Sommer, 2013). 
Crisis is an event that has the potential to threat important values and weaken an 
organizations ability to perform their essential functions (NOU, 2000:24). 
A crisis could develop into a disaster, which is an event with serious injuries and losses 
(NOU, 2000:24). 
Intentional adverse event is a type of adverse event that people do intentionally, examples 
here are terrorism, organized crime and security threat activities (Sommer, 2013). 
Preparedness is measures to prevent, restrict or handle crisis or other adverse events (NOU, 
2000:24). Preparedness is planning of measures to handle adverse events as good as possible 
after they have happened (NOU, 2006:6). 
Prevention is actions to reduce the probability of adverse events appearing and the 
consequences of the event if it happens (NOU, 2006:6).  
Risk is a function of the likelihood of potential adverse events and their consequences. Risk 
expresses’ the risk of loss of values such as life, health, environment, economy and social 
services (NOU, 2000:24).  
Terrorism is often used as a general characteristic of several informs of adverse events. In 
this study terrorism is defined as “Actions aimed at physical objects or people where 
participants have a clear political objective to modify a given political condition through the 
use of violence”. Other characteristics include hidden planning operations, strict secrecy of 
participant’s identity, strong political or religious motivation and the use of fear as a political 
weapon (Johanesen, 1994). 
Threat is any event with the potential of causing an adverse event, this doesn’t include the 
will and probability of the event occurring (NOU, 2000:24).  
Vulnerability is the problem the systems, such as a state, company or a single computer 
system, will have to function when they are exposed to an adverse event, as well as the 
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problems the system will face to resume its activities after the event has occurred (NOU, 
2000:24).  
Safety is used to describe security from adverse events as a result of causal events.  (NOU, 
2006:6). 
Security is used to describe security from adverse events as a result of intentional events 
(NOU, 2006:6). 
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1.0 Introduction
 
In this chapter we give a brief introduction to the thesis and what we want to examine. First 
the background behind our topic is given. Thereafter we give a presentation of the problem 
description and the research question. In the end we shortly present the limitations and the 
structure of the thesis.  
1.1 Background 
Norway has traditionally been considered a low risk country related to terrorism. Temporary 
globalization and the growth of terrorism groups such as Al-Qaida –networks have been 
contributors changing this picture. Globalization has created stronger and closer ripple effects 
from distant conflicts affecting other nations, such as Norway. The terrorists have become 
more globalized through the use of Internet and other technologies, making the 
communication, gathering of partners, collaboration and information collection an easier and 
more efficient process. This also gives potential opportunities to operate alone as a terrorist. 
The terrorist attack on Utøya in Norway on the 22nd of July 2011, is a dramatic example of the 
potential of organizing and operating terrorist attacks alone (Australian Government, 2012). 
The terror attack on the 22nd of July shows that Norway is not only vulnerable against 
international terrorism attacks, but also national terrorism performed by Norwegian citizens 
themselves (Kjøk, 2014). The terrorism risk in Norway is still low, but people have become 
more aware of the threat of terrorism and that it can happen in Norway (Kjøk, 2014).  
The Norwegian petroleum industry has experienced the threat of terrorism on close hold 
during the In Amenas attack in 2013 on a gas installation in Algeria. Statoil especially and 
other oil companies operating on the NCS, have strengthen their security of information, 
personnel and facilities within the Norwegian petroleum industry. Terrorist groups have 
shown interest in economical targets, where oil and gas installations on the NCS represent a 
large amount of economical importance nationally and internationally (Australian 
Government, 2012). Norway’s openness and valuable petroleum installations makes them 
vulnerable terror targets (Berglund, 2014).  
Petroleum companies are constantly moving further north on the NCS. The Arctic areas are 
believed to hold huge reserves of oil and gas about 22% of the worlds remaining 
undiscovered petroleum resources (Arctic, 2014). For decades the cost level of operating in 
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the Arctic area has been high. This situation is changing due to high oil prices and increased 
competition for new petroleum resources as a consequence of the increased demand (Hasle, 
2008). A series of new petroleum field centres are in the making in the Norwegian Arctic 
waters, located in the Norwegian Barents Sea. The Norwegian Government states the 
development in the Barents Sea will strengthen the long-term foundation of the Norwegian 
wealth creation (Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2011). The oil and gas companies 
operating in the Barents Sea also face new challenges due to its complex and harsh 
environment with long distances between shore and the petroleum fields, lack of 
infrastructure and sensitive ecosystem (DNV, 2012).  
The petroleum companies need to build adapted preparedness systems that meets the 
challenges within the Barents Sea region (Borch, 2013). It is required from the Norwegian 
government that petroleum companies prevent and handle major risks in the Arctic as 
environmental-, hazard- and crisis risks. The industry needs to develop robust techniques and 
solutions to maintain a high-functional preparedness system. Due to lack of infrastructure and 
long distances operators and actors need to cooperate and share resources, knowledge and 
competence on a much higher level that further south on the NCS (Petroleumtilsynet, 2013). 
Oil and gas installations on the NCS today are not designed to withstand security attacks such 
as terrorism (Johanesen, 1994). Greenpeace has several times demonstrated how easy it is to 
enter oil and gas installations (Lewis, 2013a).  
This discussion above shows that the preparedness system offshore in the Barents Sea needs 
to be strengthened and adapted to the challenges within the Barents Sea and terrorism. 
Terrorist attacks in Norway and globally has made us realize that Norwegian oil platforms 
might be potential terror threat goals. This has increased the focus on preparedness and 
security against terrorism in the petroleum industry (Petroleumtilsynet, 2014b).  
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“How should the managerial roles within the 2nd line preparedness team be 
strengthened to handle terror threats in the Barents Sea? 
1.2 Problem description and research question  
In this study we examine how the 2nd line preparedness team and their managerial roles can 
strengthens to be prepared for terror threats in the Barents Sea. The research question is as 
following:  
 
 
 
1. Firstly we examine how the 2nd line preparedness team can be improved and 
strengthen to meet different types of terror threats in the Barents Sea. Thereafter we 
examine what measures the oil companies’ needs to implement to strengthen their 2nd 
line preparedness team to perform their managerial roles. 
“How can the managerial roles within the 2nd preparedness team be 
strengthened to prepare for terror attacks in the Barents Sea?” 
2. Secondly we examine how the national preparedness systems prepare for terror threats 
in the Barents Sea. We examine how the governmental framework and regulations are 
set for the 2nd line preparedness team to handle terror threats in the Barents Sea. Also 
the cooperation between the oil companies, authorities, ministries and the public 
preparedness actors are being examined.  
“What measures should the national preparedness system implement to 
strengthen the 2nd line preparedness teams ability to prepare for terror threats 
in the Barents Sea?”  
3. Thirdly we examine what challenges the preparedness team meet in the Barents Sea 
when preparing for terror attacks. We examine what is required of knowledge and 
competence within the preparedness team to meet these challenges. There will also be 
a comparison of what resources that are needed within the Barents Sea to reach the 
same preparedness level as the rest of the NCS.  
“What are the main preparedness challenges in the Barents Sea that needs to 
be solved for the 2nd line preparedness team to handle terror threats?” 
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4. Finally we examine how the 2nd line preparedness team should prepare for different 
types of terrorists and terror attacks. We also examine what risk assessments are done 
to evaluate the trends and developments in the terror threat picture. Last we examine 
what knowledge and experience the 2nd preparedness team should have to understand 
the terror risks facing the petroleum installations.  
“What measures should the oil companies and their 2nd line preparedness team 
implement to prepare for terror threats in the Barents Sea?” 
Bellow is a figure illustrating the research problems mention above, divided into four 
variables influencing the 2nd line preparedness team: 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
Figure 1 - A visual illustration of the research problem 
We see that the four variables affecting the 2nd line preparedness team also have a correlation 
them in between. Meaning that it will not be possible for us to examine these four variables 
independent from each other. Even though these variables are not fully independent from each 
other we have still structured the thesis into four individual parts to create a better overview 
and understanding of what we examine. In the analysis and conclusion parts we will 
implement these four variables more to give a better understanding of the preparedness 
system.  
The 2nd preparedness line team plays an important role during a crisis situation assisting the 
platforms with resources, information and instructions. Due to their large responsibility it 
would be interesting too examine how these roles could be strengthen to handle terror threat 
The 2nd line preparedness team  
1. The oil 
companies 
preparedness 
system 
2. The 
Norwegian 
preparedness 
system  
3. The Barents 
Sea 4. Terrorism 
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situations in a turbulent and extreme environment, such as the Barents Sea. The performance 
of these roles is dependent on how the petroleum companies structure rest of their 
preparedness system and how the national preparedness system is structured and facilitate for 
the 2nd line preparedness to handle terror threats in the Barents Sea.    
1.3 Limitations 
There are some limitations to this study that should be mentioned.  
The preparedness system is a complex system with many factors influencing how the oil 
companies are able to prepare for different hazards and accidents. An important element that 
gives limitations for this research is the choice of a theoretical framework, which gives 
greater emphasis on certain aspects. Crisis management consists of several processes 
including before, during and after a crisis situation. This includes everything from 
preparedness, mitigation of effect, recovery and return to normal life (Duyan, 2012). This 
study only focuses on the preparedness phase, which is how the company and other actors 
prepare themselves for a crisis situation. 
Crisis situation can occur for many reasons and we have in this study chosen to focus on the 
crisis situations as a result of extreme forms for terrorism including the discussing of 
environmental activists offshore. Focusing only on the threat of terrorism has narrowed our 
study to only examine how the preparedness management system function related to security, 
and not safety covering threats such as fire, oil spills etc. Terrorists can attack different parts 
of the petroleum industry, such as onshore plants, refineries, offices and buildings in several 
locations on the NCS both onshore and offshore. We have chosen to limit this study to 
potential terror attacks of offshore installations in the Barents Sea.  
In the empirical data collection we have chosen to focus on two major petroleum companies 
ENI Norge AS and Statoil AS. This is mainly due to their present or future present in the 
Barents Sea, representing the oil and gas installations Snøhvit, Goliat and Johan Castberg. In 
addition we have examine the function of external preparedness actors such as ACONA AS, 
delivering preparedness services to ENI Norge AS. From the governmental part of the 
preparedness system we have mainly focused on the role of the Norwegian Police and PSA. 
There would have been relevant to study other oil companies on the NCS, other preparedness 
Master	  thesis	  –	  Master	  of	  Sciences	  in	  Energy	  Management	  	  Bodø,	  2014	  
 
Bodø Graduate School of Business  
 
6 
Chapter 1  
Intriduction 
Chapter 2     
Theory 
Chapter 3 
Methodology 
Chapther 4 
Emperical Data  
Chapther 5 Data 
Analysis 
Chapter 6 
Conclusion and  
recommendations 
participants during a crisis situation, and authority bodies, but due to limited time and other 
actors have been excluded.  
1.4 Thesis structure  
The thesis consist of six chapters:   
 
 
Figure 2 - Structure of the thesis 
The introduction chapter given an overview of the problem statement and research question 
we study in this thesis. In the introduction chapter we also argue why this topic is relevant, 
and the limitation of the study. 
Theory is covered in chapter 2, where the main focus is on managerial roles and preparedness 
theory, organizational culture and theory related to terror and complex environments.  
The methodology of the research is presented in chapter 3. The aim of this chapter is to 
explain and argue for how the research has been conducted methodologically. We explain 
which methods used to gather empirical data and why these approaches are chosen. 
The empirical data is gathered in chapter 4, presenting the secondary and primary data 
together. The secondary data is mainly from articles, academic books, Internet and reports, 
while the primary data is gathered through 10 in-depth interviews.  
The analysis is represented in chapter 5, linking the theory and empirical data. The chapter is 
divided into four parts, which present each of the four independent variables that affect the 2nd 
line preparedness team and its managerial roles.   
The final conclusion is presented in chapter 6, with further study recommendations. 
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2.0 Theory  
This chapter sets the theoretical framework for our research, determines what variables that 
are measured and what statistical relationships that are examined. The theoretical framework 
gives an overview of the theories used in the research and form the basic for the empirical 
study and the analysis of the results. In this research the theory will help to explain what 
managerial roles that are needed within the preparedness team to face new threats in more 
complex and turbulent environment related to terror attacks on oil and gas installation.  
We focus on some theoretical approaches to try to describe and explore how the different 
independent variables influences the managerial roles in the 2nd line preparedness teams 
ability to meet terror threats in the Barents Sea. We have divided the theories into sub chapter, 
where each theory is related to an independent variable to be able to analyse the empirical 
data.  
As we wanted to examine the managerial roles in the 2nd line preparedness team, we first 
define what a preparedness team is, their function and the managerial roles within the team. 
There are many theories related to managerial roles, where we use Mintzberg managerial role 
theory as a foundation for this research. The theory related to preparedness is generally 
conducted from the authorities and other public agencies.  
The oil company’s preparedness team are influenced by many factors and in this study we 
have focuses on four independent factors that in their own way can influence the managerial 
roles in the preparedness team. The aim was to find suitable theory related to the relationship 
between the different independent variables and the managerial roles. The first subchapter 
present theory related to the oil company’s organization culture and how this affect the 
manager’s capacity to handle crisis situations. We also present theory related to exercises, 
which is a foundation for the managerial roles to be able to handle different types of crisis 
situation in more turbulent environment including several actors.  
The second subchapter present theory related to the preparedness institution and how they 
affect the managerial roles in the preparedness system. There are different approaches to how 
the authority and the industry collaborate in terms of preparedness.   
The third sub chapter present theory related to an operational context and how this affects the 
managerial roles in a preparedness system. This chapter defines a complex environment and 
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what this requires from the 2nd line preparedness team to obtain a high security level. The 
chapter also gives an introduction to theory about collaboration in turbulent situations in 
terms of resource allocation.   
The last subchapter, terrorism, focus on various forms of terror attacks and terrorists that the 
preparedness team needs to prepare for. The managerial roles within the team need to 
understand and be aware of these threats in order to practice and exercise on different terror 
scenarios. Some theory is related to the terrorist capacity and the potential damage they can 
cause to oil installations and the organization. Other theories are related to the development in 
the terror threat picture.  
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2.1 Preparedness team  
A preparedness organization is responsible of individual jurisdictions. These organizations 
consist of preparedness teams that are responsible of coordinating preparedness activities 
among those actors within the organization, other public and private actors (Blanchard, 2007). 
The preparedness teams shall reduce the consequences of a terror attack and protect the 
people, and the oil and gas installations in a crisis situation (University of Oslo, 2014). The 
main goal of a preparedness team is primarily saving lives, protect the environment and 
ensure values (NOU, 2000:24).  
“The preparedness teams within the preparedness organization are those who are planed, 
established, trained and exercised to handle crisis situations” (NORSOK STANDARD Z-
013N, 2001) 
There are three main preparedness teams, where the 1st line preparedness team includes 
personnel on the rigs and installations, while the 2nd and 3rd teams represent those 
preparedness teams onshore. In general the preparedness teams represent all personnel used in 
a crisis situation (NORSOK STANDARD Z-013N, 2001).  Preparedness is defined as “the 
planning and preparation of measures to limit or handle crisis or other situations in the best 
possible way” (NOU, 2000:24, NOU, 2006:6). A team is defined as “a group of people with 
different skills and different tasks, who work together on a common project, service, or goal, 
with a meshing of functions and mutual support” (University of Washington, 2010 p.1). The 
preparedness teams create strategies and plan to protect the organization against accidents and 
crisis situations. Crises will occur despite of these preventions and it is therefore important 
that the preparedness teams train and practice how to handle crisis situations (NOU, 2006:6).  
2.1.1 Introduction  
The preparedness team consist of several members, where each member has their own 
managerial role, and are responsible to give orders and instructions to other personnel within 
other teams, the organization and other actors. There are decisions taking individually by each 
team member and collaborative decisions between the members.  
Preparedness management is about making a group of people conducting certain tasks in a 
dynamic and complex situation that are constantly changing. A preparedness manager 
coordinates the preparedness teams resources and ensures that tasks are preformed in an 
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effective way reducing harms (Sommer, 2013). The preparedness manager is highly 
dependent on other members of the preparedness team to successfully handle the situation 
(Bråten, 2013).  
Coming together is a beginning; keeping together is progress; working together is 
success."   - Henry Ford 
The preparedness team must be well structured and consist of personnel with the right skills, 
where necessary resources should be available for the team to function optimal (University of 
Washington, 2010). The preparedness team needs to be organized and managed across 
different actors and departments (Aarset, 2014b). Teams are often structured hierarchical, 
where the member’s tasks are divided into sub-components. A hierarchical structure can be 
effective, but it challenges a good communication flow within the team (Brun, 2003). 
The preparedness team needs to be large enough to handle potential crisis situations and have 
the knowledge and capacity available to take the right decisions. The size of the team depends 
on the complexity and extent of the organization it operates within, and if the team becomes 
too large it can contribute to problems.  A team should consist of different skills covering the 
areas technical, security, law, communication and information. In addition the team needs to 
take good collaborative decisions under stress (Aarset, 2014a). 
The offshore industry has long tradition with teamwork where many of their operations 
require personnel teamwork. For the preparedness management team to be prepared there are 
certain requirements for the different roles. The members of the team must be able to listen 
and give constructive feedback, to avoid communication problems. The members of the team 
have to have a clear understanding of their own role, but also understand the other members 
roles if something goes wrong (Flin, 1997).  
2.1.2 Managerial roles  
Each member of a preparedness team has their own responsibility area where they function as 
a manager. Mintzberg defines a manager as a person that are responsible for the activities, 
tactic and training of a team (Mintzberg, 1973). Being prepared for emergencies is about good 
management where each member of the team needs to organize and have control of the whole 
situation. The manager needs to have the right competence and capability to coordinate all the 
actors involved in a preparedness situation (Bråten, 2013).  
Master	  thesis	  –	  Master	  of	  Sciences	  in	  Energy	  Management	  	  Bodø,	  2014	  
 
Bodø Graduate School of Business  
 
11 
There is a handful of research on what managers should do, rather than what managers 
actually do. Many would say that managing is about planning, organizing, coordinating and 
controlling, but Mintzberg disagree stating that this is not what happens in real situations 
(Mintzberg, 1989). Henry Mintzberg states that there are ten primary roles or behaviours that 
can be used to categorize a managers different functions as shown in the model bellow: 
(Mintzberg, 1989)  
 
Interpersonal 
• Figurehead 
• Leader 
• Liaison 
 
Informational  
• Monitor 
• Disseminator 
• Spokesperson 
 
Decisional 
• Entrepreneur 
• Disturbance handler 
• Resource allocator 
• Negotiator 
Figure 3 - The manager's role (Mintzberg, 1973 pp.92-93)  
The manger has three interpersonal roles, which arises directly from authority. The first one is 
that a manager is a figurehead in the organization where they perform some duties of 
ceremonial nature. As a leader the manager is responsible for peoples work, hiring and 
training staff. In addition the manager is also responsible making contacts outside the vertical 
chain of command (Mintzberg, 1989). Henri Fayol is one of the most influential contributors 
to the modern concept of management believe that authority and responsibility are 
requirements for the manager to achieve the organizations goal (Pryor, 2010).  
The role of a manager under communication and interaction with external stakeholders is to 
link them with the organization. Firstly the manager needs to monitor all information and pass 
it over to the organization. The last part of the information role is to be a spokesperson for the 
organization and to give advise to the organizations personnel (Mintzberg, 1989).  
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The information part is not a goal in it self, but rather a necessary tool for the manager to take 
the right decisions. During the decision making process the manager plays a central role in the 
organization and where Mintzberg divides the manager’s job into four roles. Firstly a manger 
is an entrepreneur that is responsible for improving the organization and adapt to changes in 
the environment. One of the entrepreneur’s tasks is to choose between different ideas. 
Secondly a manager function as a disturbance handler and are responsible of responding to 
pressure from external factors and stakeholders. Thirdly a manager allocates resources 
deciding what parts of the organization gets what and improves resource decisions. A 
manager also function as a negotiator which is a integrated part throughout the whole 
managerial work process (Mintzberg, 1989).  
Its difficult to separate these ten roles since they all overlap each other. None of the roles can 
be removed from the manger process without the process collapsing. Two or three employees 
are not able to share a leader role unless they are able to act as one unit. This indicates that it 
is not possible to divide the ten roles unless they are able to re-integrate the roles afterwards. 
The real problem is linked to the information role. If the information sharing process is not 
complete throughout the whole organization the teamwork will collapse. Even though most 
managers fulfil all the ten roles there are also managers not given simultaneous attention to all 
the roles. This highly depends on the personality and experience of the managers and what 
organization the manager works for (Mintzberg, 1989).  
  
Master	  thesis	  –	  Master	  of	  Sciences	  in	  Energy	  Management	  	  Bodø,	  2014	  
 
Bodø Graduate School of Business  
 
13 
2.2. Factors influencing preparedness management teams  
The modern society sets high demand on the performance of task in form of team work, due 
to complex assignment that requires extensive knowledge, expertise and experience, the roles 
has to be divided. All the qualities to solve situations such as an emergency situation, cannot 
be hold by one individual (Kelfstad, 2011). Many factors and resources influence the different 
roles in the oil companies’ preparedness team. During all the phases of a preparedness 
situation the members of the team are primarily responsible for the health of safety of they 
employees in the company (OSHA).  
2.2.1 Organizational culture and managerial roles  
Organizational culture has an influence on how the preparedness team handle crisis situations. 
There is usually a difference between what is done during a crisis situation and what was 
planned to do during a crisis situation. This is highly influenced by the organizational culture, 
how the members of the preparedness team thinks and their attitudes (Bråten, 2013). 
Organizational culture is describes as  
“A pattern of basic assumptions that a given group has invented, discovered, or 
developed in learning to cope with its problems of external adaptation and internal 
integration, and that have worked well enough to be considered valid, and therefore to 
be taught to new members as the correct way to perceive, think, and feel in relation to 
those problems” (Schein, 1984 p.1). 
Organizational culture could be anything from common behaviour, to new corporate values 
that the management wish to implement in their organization. Even though we know our 
organization well, it does not automatically mean we know how it arose, how it has changed 
over time and what made it change. To answer these questions it is essential to understand the 
dynamic evolutionary forces contributing to these changes (Schein, 1984). 
The organizational culture needs to be spread throughout the whole organization for it to be 
valid and it needs to be taught to new employees or members (Schein, 1990). 
Organizational members bring changes to the organizational culture based on their 
perceptions, thoughts, and feelings. One way to improve the security level is to change the 
Master	  thesis	  –	  Master	  of	  Sciences	  in	  Energy	  Management	  	  Bodø,	  2014	  
 
Bodø Graduate School of Business  
 
14 
Exercisis	  and	  training	  Table	  top	  exercise	  	  
Functional	  exercise	  
Full-­‐scale	  exercise	  	  
organizational culture (NOU, 2000:24). To change the organizational culture, the employees 
perception, thoughts and feelings about security needs to change (Schein, 1984). 
The organizational culture is affected by the organizations ability to test their preparedness 
plans through preparedness exercises. A condition for conducting preparedness in a 
purposefully way with a certainty of a great result is exercises between the oil companies, the 
police and the armed force (Politiet, 2011). Preparedness exercises will be based on the design 
of crisis situations and accidents that might occur in the oil industry sector. The goal of an 
exercise is to impose the ability to solve different tasks during a real crisis situation (Bråten, 
2013). Its important for the organization to train for different crisis situations and these 
different types of practice can be divided into three main categories  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4 - Preparedness exercises (Bråten, 2013, pp.22-23)  
Tabletop exercise normally consist of interactive discussion of a simulated scenario where the 
participants are distributed with their own case study and must explain how they will solve 
the crisis situation. The exercise is normally conducted in a conference room and focus on the 
roles and actions of the individuals, the interaction between the different roles and 
development of decision-making strategies. The exercise emphasis how people individually 
thinking and the reasons behind the decisions they take along the way (Bråten, 2013). The 
tabletop exercise is a very useful training method that only requires a modest commitment in 
terms of cost, time and resources. The exercise is also a effective way to evaluate plans and 
procedures with the help from key personnel with emergency responsibility. The 
disadvantages connected to the exercise is that there is some lack of realism connected to the 
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exercise, only provides training on some parts of the plans and its difficult to provide a 
practical way to demonstrate the system (Agency).  
 
Functional exercise focuses on the coordination between several actors at the same time. 
There are only some part of the emergency plan that is tested in practice, which makes the 
exercise more realistic then typical tabletop exercises (Bråten, 2013). 
 
Full-scale exercise is as close to a real situation as possible with location, resources and 
personnel that would be present during a crisis situation. The exercise will be on a larger 
scale, scope and number of participant then functional exercise. This type of exercise test 
several elements of the emergency plan and more players are being tested simultaneously. 
This can be done in two different ways either where the players is prepared or that the 
situations are totally unprepared (Bråten, 2013) 
2.2.2 Preparedness institutions and managerial roles 
An effective preparedness management team must ensure clear roles and responsibilities 
between its members, and there need to be clear roles between the team and other parties 
collaboration during a preparedness situation. Parties that are usually involved in the 
preparedness situation are the authorities, the industry and suppliers. In this case the industry 
represent the oil and gas companies.  
The performance-based model gives a clear split of responsibilities, where the authority is 
responsible of the performance goals and acceptance criteria. The industry is responsible of 
making sure that the performance goals are met (Tørstad, 2010 ).  
Another approach is the prescriptive model where the authority will determine specific the 
performance requirements and approve the oil and gas company’s preparedness plan. 
Normally the oil and gas company will be defined in the regulation and how they should carry 
out liable operations. This approach might cause confusion when something goes wrong. The 
responsibilities between the parties are not always fixed and might vary between different 
pieces of the regulation. It would therefore be more convenience using a performance-based 
model when the authority want to minimize their own risk and liability (Tørstad, 2010 ).  
A crisis situation consists of overlapping work that requires a clear distribution of roles and 
responsibility. In overlapping work it is important that all participants have knowledge and 
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understanding of the their own responsibility and tasks, while at the same time know the other 
participants roles (Bråten, 2013).  
In a turbulent and complex environment, facing the threat of terrorism, the different parties 
need to integrate on a high and complex level to be able to handle these threats. Collaboration 
has a higher intensity than cooperation and coordination, where all parts contribute, share 
resources, rewards and leadership to create a structure to meet common goal. Successful 
collaboration relies on openness and knowledge sharing, but where each partner still needs to 
have focus and accountability on own organization. It is required that all parts are committed 
to the shared goals and responsibility. In addition they should develop a jointly structure that 
are designed to share resources, risks and rewards. When working together it is extremely 
important that everyone have the same perception of the purpose behind the collaboration, 
commitment requirements, and expectations of the other partners (Lukas, 2014).  
2.2.3 Operational context and managerial roles  
The society has gone through enormous changes in the last century and the environment has 
become more complex, with high interaction and dependency between actors and activities. 
Complex environments are characterized with rapid and often unpredictable changes (Njå, 
1998).  
The correlation of different roles represent one of the main challenges within a dynamic and 
complex situation (Sommer, 2013). It requires a high level of management to keep a clear 
overview and control of the situation and to delegate tasks and responsibilities. A manager 
will need to handle a stressful situation under time pressure with several external influence 
factors (Sjoberg, 2011).  
The preparedness team is dependent on resources and skills from a wide range of actors to 
that needs to be integrated into one process. A highly complex environment requires many 
participants, the more participant and roles within a system the more challenges it will 
become to handle the situation. This requires a common framework coordinating all the 
participants and their responsibility and roles (Hossain, 2012).  
Though collaboration the preparedness team are capable of gaining greater resources, 
recognitions and reward when facing threats (Aiim.org, 2013). Resource collaboration during 
a crisis situation is necessary and could be anything from personnel, helicopter services, 
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equipment and communication lines. The allocation of resources between the different actors 
depends on the situation, what resources that are available and needed. To utilize these 
resources in the best way are highly dependent on the communication and information sharing 
between the participants. The resources need to be organized where they are easily available 
during a crisis situation, with back up resources (Njå, 1998). Sharing resources through 
communication and information sharing makes it possible for the preparedness team to gain 
control of the situation (Hossain, 2012).  
2.2.4 Types of terrorism and managerial roles  
Terrorist attack was put on the map in 1970 when the world experienced the first hijacking 
ever. The view on terrorism has changed in the recent years due to terrorist attacks such as the 
11/9 in the U.S and it is expected to continue increasing (Duyan, 2012). The political and 
social environment is constantly heating up. One of the main reasons is the increased political 
role of the government in the economy (Combs, 2013). Technology, human and social 
environment has become more complex, interrelated, and tightly coupled where people have 
become more informed and educated, demanding safer and more secure products. Mass 
media, satellite communication and computer networks have made people join social action 
groups that often leads to confrontation and in some cases to intentional acts such as terrorism 
(Lerbinger, 1997). This has affected the structure of the security force where large amounts 
are used on protection of vital installations and systems (Combs, 2013). 
There is no general definition of terrorism, but some limits are important to define. The 
Security Act defines terrorist actions as: “Illegal use of, or the threat of use of, force or 
violence against persons and property, in an attempt to exert pressure on the authorities of a 
country or the population or society on general in order to achieve political, religious or 
ideological aims” (Norwegian Directorate for Civil Protection, 2013 p.145) 
With today's challenges there is a need for an effective preparedness management team. “To 
develop a high level of preparedness, we must have sufficient knowledge of the dangers that 
may threaten the community and population. It is almost impossible to define goals and what 
dangers we are exposed to at all times” (NOU, 2000:24 p.17) The preparedness system is a 
combination of different operations and personnel requiring a dynamic structure to adapt to 
and handle new situation where the risks are changing (Nilsen, 2010).  
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In the latest year there has been several terrorist attack increasing the terror risk and making 
us more aware of new threats in terms of terrorism. These events requires that preparedness 
teams are prepared for similar events in the future, but also other types of terrorist attacks that 
still has not occurred.  
Terrorism is political, economical and social motivated, where attacks are performed in 
various ways with different methods, intentions and goals (Bråten 2013). A terror attack can 
be seen as a strategy, where violence is used to engender fear among political ends, where 
terrorists believe that justice and political goals can be achieved through violence and fear 
(O’Kane 2012).   
The key elements of a military decision-making process is that the process consists of four 
clearly identifiable elements that make up a continuous mental process: observation, 
evaluation, decision and action. Ability to conduct this process faster than your opponent is 
crucial for success in future conflicts (Arsham, 1994). The manager as a decisions maker 
needs to have full information of the situation and take a decision and act upon that.  To take 
this decision the manger needs to know all possible alternatives, the consequences of each 
alternative, be prepared for these consequences and compare the consequences and to 
determine which one to choose (Turpin, 2004).  
The ability to handle a terrorist attack depends on the response time from the preparedness 
team. Response time is the time from the attack happens, until the forces are inserted. The 
respond time will depend on the distance to the accident site, the time it takes for the 
preparedness actors to be ready and how quickly they get notice from the oil companies. The 
respond time will also be affected by the people in charges ability to make quick decision and 
forces that are available in a short time (Ulriksen, 2013). 
The respond quality depends on the capacity to gather the right resources to handle the 
situation. This requires that the decision maker understand which resources the different 
attacks require in different environments, which is dependent on local knowledge (Ulriksen, 
2013). 
The UN defines a terrorist as “a person illegally and intentionally takes action causing death 
or serious injury, or serious damage to public or private property (including public areas, 
government building, public transport and infrastructure” (UN, 2013). It is important that the 
preparedness team understands patterns of behaviour and evaluates forthcoming patterns of 
Master	  thesis	  –	  Master	  of	  Sciences	  in	  Energy	  Management	  	  Bodø,	  2014	  
 
Bodø Graduate School of Business  
 
19 
different terrorists (Combs, 2013). During a terrorist attack the decision maker need to have 
an overview of the different potential terrorist and which potential damage they can cause the 
organization. 
There are suggested that different terrorists can be divided into three categories.  In the last 
decade the majority of individuals and groups carrying out terrorist acts have been crusaders. 
Crusaders act upon reasons that are often unclear to themselves and others. Their goals are 
often less understandable, idealistically inspired with a mix of different philosophies. They 
seek not personal gain, prestige and power, thinking they serve a higher cause. They are 
professional, well trained and disciplined, where death is seen as a reward since death is seen 
as a reward rather a penalty and negotiation is minimal (Combs 2013). 
Craziest are emotional distributed individual, driven to commit terrorist attacks based on own 
reasons that are not clear to anyone else. If the negotiators are able to understand the 
motivation and goal of the craziest, it would be possible to negotiate with the terrorist (Combs 
2013). 
Criminals are individuals performing terrorist acts for more easily understood reasons. They 
are fully responsible and aware of own actions, and their motives and goal are clear. 
Criminals are moistly willing to negotiate, with specific and logic demand that are possible to 
be met by rational alternatives. They have a desire to survive (Combs 2013). 
Type of 
Terrorist 
Motive/Goal Willing to Negotiate? Expectation of 
Survival 
Crusader  “Higher cause” 
(usually a blend of 
religious and political) 
Seldom, since to do so could 
be seen as a betrayal of the 
cause 
Minimal, since death 
offers reward in 
“afterlife” 
Criminal  
 
Personal gain/profit 
 
Usually, in return for profit 
and/or safe passage  
Strong  
Crazy Clear only to 
perpetrator 
Possible, but only if 
negotiator can understand 
Strong, but not based 
on reality 
Figure 5 - Different types of terrorist (Combs, 2013 p.54) 
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The terror attack on an oil platform can take place in different ways requiring that the 
preparedness team have an overview of different terror attacks scenarios. (Johansen, 1994) 
suggest that the scenarios can be based on the actor’s capacity and intention, where those 
actors with the highest capacity and intentions equals the highest threat.   
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6 - Definition of threat (Johansen, 1994 p.21) 
To be able to set scenarios and understand the terror threat picture the preparedness team 
should be aware of the triggers and trends in the world society that will have an impact on the 
terror threat picture. These factors are constantly changing and the preparedness team needs to 
be updated on these changes to create realistic terror attack scenarios to train and practice for. 
The list does not include all causes, but it gives a comprehensive set of causes of terrorism 
(Transnational Terrorism, 2007). 
Rapid modernization and urbanization such as high economic growth has a strong correlation 
with the emergence of ideological terrorism. This highly represents countries with sudden 
wealth, where new radical ideologies. The relationship between terrorism and democracy 
shows high correlations. It is proven that a lack of democracy, civil liberties and the rule of 
law are preconditions for domestic terrorism. Countries with weak political state struggle to 
gain territorial control giving room for terrorists to perform safe training and exercise under 
good training facilities. Such as political violence, civil wars, revolutions or occupation may 
increase the acceptance of terrorism. When people grow up in cultures with hate or revenge 
against other national groups it will most likely increase the acceptance of terrorism and 
violence. When there are power distances and hegemony between groups, the oppressed 
group will be tempted to act with terrorism to gain political impact. Groups who feel 
discriminated based on their ethnic or religious origin can apply to terrorism when their rights 
Actors  
Capacity 
 
Intention 
Threat  
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to equal social and economical opportunities are denied. Another condition creating 
motivation for terrorism is the lack of political participation (Transnational Terrorism, 2007). 
Summary  
In this chapter we have presented the theories is the foundation for theoretical framework in 
this thesis. The chapter starts up with an introduction to preparedness team theory and 
theories related to managerial roles. Then we present theory related to the independent 
variables we examine in this study and the main theories are organizational culture, 
preparedness exercises, preparedness institutions, operational context and different types of 
terrorism. We have also provided a basis for the choice of the theoretical framework, that we 
think are necessary to answer the research question. These theoretical approaches are the 
foundation of the data analysis we conduct in chapter 5.  
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3.0 Methodology  
The aim of this chapter is to explain and argue for how this research has been conducted 
methodological. The chapter covers the choice of research method and research design and 
gives a detailed description of the data collection. The data in this research is provided to give 
good answers and understanding of the research question and the topic that is being examined 
(Easterby-Smith, 2012). In addition arguments are given why we have chosen the preferred 
approached instead of others. Further this chapter explains which interview participants, 
which represent the population, that have contributed and why this selection is considered a 
good sample size for this research. Finally an explanation is given of the data analysed, an 
evaluation of its validity, reliability and its ethical considerations.  
3.1 Research Design 
Research is according to Booth (2008) about finding the right information, evaluate it and 
report is clearly and accurately to solve a problem or answer a question. Easterby-Smith 
(2012) on the other hand see research  as a process where data is collected, analysed and 
interpreted to clarify a conclusion.  
The research design explains how the research is organized, how the data is collected and how 
the data is analysed to answer and explain the research question (Easterby-Smith, 2012). It is 
primarily the research question and the purpose of the research that determines what research 
method that is being used. The time limitations and the length of the research also have an 
impact on the choice of research method (Yin, 2009). In a research project the objects can be 
divided into three parts with the aim to either explore, describe or explain questions 
(Easterby-Smith, 2012).  
The philosophical position is the underlying factor in the research design, and researcher draw 
from different epistemological perspective when conducting their research. Epistemology is 
different ways of enquiring into the nature of the world and will affect the methodology the 
researcher chooses to address (Easterby-Smith, 2012).  
According to Easterby-Smith (2012) there are two different views on how to conduct  
research, positivism and social constructionism. A researcher with a positivistic view sees the 
world as external and measure properties through objective methods instead of sensations and 
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intuitions. The social constructionist on the other hand see the world as not objective and 
exterior, where peoples communicate their experience with thoughts and feelings.  
As researcher we view the world as socially constructed, which gives meaning by people. The 
aim of the research is to increase the general understanding of how the managerial roles 
within the preparedness team should be strengthened to handle terror threats in the Barents 
Sea. This research is therefor based on social constructionist where we as researcher take part 
of what is being observed and our results are based on a general understanding of the situation 
through rich data collection.  
3.1.1 Explorative research  
Explorative research is used when the researcher tries to provide insight and understanding of 
phenomena, where the research process is flexible and unstructured. The analysis method 
most often used in explorative research is collection of primary data through a qualitative 
research design. Because little is predetermined, the exploration research is flexible and 
allows the researcher to account for unexpected conditions. In exploratory research the 
researcher often only formulate a problem statement in the beginning to emphasize the topic 
(Booth, 2008).    
Explorative research is often used when problems has not been clearly defined yet related to 
new solutions in new areas. The method is used when the researcher try to develop some 
basic understanding of the topic, and it is a proper method to use when there is not explicit set 
of hypotheses with large amount of available data (Easterby- Smith, 2012). This research has 
an exploratory design, since the how the managerial roles within the 2nd line preparedness 
team should be strengthened to handle terror threats in the Barents Sea have not been clearly 
defined in other research. In this research we try to establish the relationship between 
dependent and independent variables (Easterby-Smith, 2012). 
3.2 Qualitative Research Design 
Quantitative and qualitative designs are two different approached of conducting a research. It 
is highly important to understand the difference between these techniques in order to find the 
most proper way of collecting primary data for the problem statement and question (Easterby-
Smith, 2012). 
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Quantitative research is used to solve problems through generating numerical data or data that 
can be transformed into useable statistics. This type of data is used to quantify attitudes, 
opinions, behaviour and other defined variables and thereafter generalize results from a large 
sample population. The quantitative research is much more systematized and structured 
compared to qualitative research. It can include different types of surveys, such as online, 
paper, mobile, face-to-face and phone (Wyse, 2011).  
Qualitative research is defines by Silverman (2004  p.17) as “research that seek to provide 
understanding of human experience, perceptions, motivations and behaviours based on 
description and observation by utilizing a naturalistic interpretive approach to the subject 
and its contextual setting”. Qualitative research is primarily exploratory research. It strives to 
dig deeper into the research problem and the question using different types of unstructured or 
semi-structured techniques. Some common examples are interviews, both in groups and 
individually, observation and interaction. Compared to the quantitative research the sample 
size are smaller, but more data is collected from each participant (Wyse, 2011). 
Both quantitative and qualitative research can be used to answer our research question, 
together or alone. Quantitative research is often used to conduct a large enough sample with 
relevant information and experience. Quantitative research is often less flexible and it would 
be difficult to gather clear and good data used as exploration in this study. We seek to explore 
how different independent variables influences how the managerial roles in the preparedness 
team ability to be strengthened. It is therefore appropriate to use qualitative research to gather 
data and information through words that provides us with rich and informative data. By using 
the qualitative research design we are able to discover the views, perspectives and opinions 
among our interview participants about the topic that are relevant to be able to answer the 
research question (Easterby-Smith, 2012). 
3.3 Data Collection 
Data is collected to use as evidence to support the claims in the research, and includes 
everything that are relevant to answer a question. Data is inactive until the moment you use it 
to support a claim when answering the research question, then it will become a evidence 
(Booth, 2008). 
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This research project consists of both primary- and secondary data collection. The primary 
data is collected through interviews with participant from the petroleum industry and the 
authorities. The Secondary data collection is mainly based on former petroleum research, 
company and government reports, articles in newspapers, magazines and online, books and 
presentations from seminars. Both the primary and secondary data results are implemented in 
the data chapter and are analysed in analysis chapter (Easterby-Smith, 2012) 
3.3.1 Secondary data  
The secondary data provides the raw data used as evidence to support a claim. It is difficult to 
write a research paper without using secondary sources as a foundation (Booth, 2008). 
“Secondary data is information that already exists in form of publications or other electronic 
media, which is collected by the researcher” (Easterby-Smith, 2012 p.12) . Organizations and 
individuals collect their own data for several reasons. Firstly there are documents that are 
obligatory to be published due to regulatory reasons, in addition are earlier and future 
performances also collected. Not all of this data is confidential and researchers are able to 
access some of it through archives and data base systems. The secondary data collected in this 
research are mainly from petroleum companies, the government and other petroleum actors. 
The advantage of using these reports, articles, seminar notes and books is to get an overview 
of earlier, current and future research within the topic, and to get an up to date understanding 
and knowledge of the area that are being examine.  
There are some disadvantages using secondary data. Firstly the researcher does not have 
control of the sample and the specific data collected, when using others research. Secondly 
the data may be uncertain and not correct. Therefore it is extremely important to use reliable 
and right sources (Easterby-Smith, 2012). In this research we feel confident that the 
secondary data is trustworthy with high quality. This information has been necessary for us to 
collect, to build a strong background knowledge that was needed to provide relevant and high 
quality interviews. The information gathered from secondary data has also helped us discover 
important research elements and areas that are interesting to discuss further in the interviews 
and in the analysis part. 
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3.3.2 Primary data  
Primary data is defined by Easterby-Smith (2012 p.12) as “new information that is collected 
directly by the researcher”. Primary data gives new insight and information on areas that the 
secondary data does not cover. This gives the researchers the opportunity to go deeper into 
old research areas and/or explore new areas of research. In this study we have collected 
primary data through in-depth interviews, which is a time consuming process. By collection 
own data through interviews this gave us better control and structure of the material gathered, 
and it also gives a greater confidant that the data is credible and correct related to the research 
question.  
In this research we have gather secondary data from different relevant informant, within their 
expert area. Since the collecting of primary data is both time consuming and costly, we have 
interviewed three participants face-to-face while they were visiting the University of 
Nordland (our location) on different occasions. Another interview participant was interviewed 
by telephone. The main disadvantage with doing a phone interview is the risk of bad sound 
quality where it could be difficulties to hear what is being said and where misunderstandings 
and bad formulations can occur. When transcribing the interview some of the information that 
was given became unclear, but it was possible for us to memorize what was said on those 
blank spots. Another disadvantage using phone interviews are the lack of body language, 
facial expressions and other physical impressions that can have an influence on the interview. 
We therefor only conducted one interview over the phone, and this was mainly to save time.  
Four interviews were performed face-to-face where we travelled to the participant’s locations 
in Oslo, Stavanger and Bergen. These participants were important informants for our research 
project and it was therefor important that these interviews contained the best quality and 
accurate information as possible. In addition we saw the value of visiting the rooms the 
preparedness team operate in to get a better understanding of what is really happening during 
a crisis situation, related to the different managerial roles.  
The more the researcher plan what exactly what they needs to know during a interview, the 
more efficiently the primary source will be (Booth, 2008) To make the interviews as 
successful as possible an interview guide was sent in advance to all the participant. This was 
done so the participants could be prepared with the necessary information and consult with 
others in the company which information they could share about a sensitive topic. The 
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interview guide was not a set program for the participant to follow, but more of a guideline 
through the interview where new questions and themes were added regularly throughout the 
interview.  
An external partner did the transcription of all the interviews. This saved us a lot of time and 
made it possible for us to focus more on how to use the information gathered from the 
interviews and analyse it.  
3.3.3 Semi-structured interviews 
In our research we have chosen to use the semi-structured interview method to collect the 
primary data. Interviews are defined as the collection of data through language and 
conversations and are seen as valid and reliable data. There is a wide range of different types 
of interviews from unstructured and informal conversations to highly structured ones using 
standard questions for each respondent. Semi-structured interviews are a method in between 
these methods. Semi-structured interviews are unstructured and non-standardized where the 
researcher normally have an own list of themes and questions that are specified linked up to 
the single participant. This is done to reflect upon those areas that are most know and 
understood by the participant (Millmore, 2007). Semi-structured interviews as research 
method has given a high degree of confidentiality, as the replies of the interviewees tend to be 
more personal in nature. In addition the interview participants have shared own information 
and experience on new areas outside the researchers existing area, that are of relevance for the 
research problem (Easterby-Smith, 2012). 
Semi-structured interviews were chosen due to its rich textual data and the ability to have 
structured interviews, but with flexibility through follow up questions and the opportunity to 
discuss other relevant questions and themes. Our research situation is highly complex and 
confidential, where it is required that we as researcher flexible. It is also a good method to use 
seeking to understand the respondents “world” and to understand the participant’s opinions 
and believes about the research problem (Easterby-Smith, 2012). We provided our interview 
participants an interview guide a couple of days before the interviews. This gave both the 
participants and us control and time to prepare for the areas and questions that was covered in 
the interview. The interview guide differed from whom we interviewed and was tailor-made 
for each participant based on their role, function, and background, and the company they 
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represented. Despite this there were mainly four topics that were discussed in each interview 
guide: 
1. Preparedness management and exercises 
2. Managerial roles  
3. Terrorism attacks  
4. The Barents Sea  
After the first interviews the four main topics were still relevant to examine further, but 
adjustments were made based on new information where some topics and questions was 
covered well while others were still unclear. “Terrorism attacks on oil and gas installations” 
are a sensitive topic, where all of our interview participants had limitations on what they 
could discuss and give out of information. These restrictions created some limitations on our 
research and we therefore tried to focus on those areas that were open for discussion and 
public sharing. Throughout the interviews we also realized that several areas that had been 
given less attention would be relevant to examine further and in more detail. Overall the 
interviews compensated each other very well, where we got shared information and opinions 
on the same subjects and on different subjects. The interviews provided us with a wide range 
of relevant and accurate data, where we got a clear and diverse insight in how the different 
areas influence how the different actors prepare and handle a crisis situation. We also got the 
impression that all of our interview participants felt comfortable and interested in sharing 
relevant information to an important and interesting research problem. 
3.3.4 Sampling  
To collect valid primary data, it was important to interview the right organizations and people 
that are involved and familiar with the processes and systems used to prepare and handle 
terrorism threats on oil installations in the Barents Sea. The population refers to the whole set 
of entitles that the research problem is linked to (Easterby-Smith, 2012). In our research 
project the represented population becomes the people working in petroleum organization, 
governmental actors and other external actors that influence the preparedness management 
systems. Sample is the people drawn from the population and is a very common used tool 
both for surveys and interviews. The optimal would be to interview all the relevant members 
of the organizations, but this is impossible due to time and access limitations. It is therefore 
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important to pick a sample that gives the best representation of the population (Easterby-
Smith, 2012).  
In this research it is highly difficult to state the probability of each member of the population 
that are being sampled. We are therefore using the non-probability sampling design that is 
defined by Easterby-Smith (2012 p.228) as “a sampling designs where the likelihood of each 
population entity being included in the sample cannot be known”. This sampling method can 
never give the same level and quality as probability based sampling where each entity that are 
part of the sample is known. There are several types of non-probability sampling methods. In 
this research three of them are being used: convenience sampling, quota sampling and 
snowball sampling. Convenience sampling is a method used to select samples based on their 
availability. In our research 3 participants were interviewed at the University, due to their 
easy access, but also due to their highly relevance for the research project. Quota sampling 
has been used to divide the different organizations into actor groups according to their role 
and function within their company. Basically one or two people from each actor group were 
chosen to represent their organization. The aim is to make sure that each of the categories is 
represented according to the quota proposition. Snowball sampling is the process where the 
researcher asks the already chosen participants about other relevant participants to interview. 
In our interviews we always asked if the participant had any recommendations of others to 
interview that would be relevant and useful to interview. This type of sampling method gave 
us really good feedback information and where many of our interview participants are based 
on this method (Easterby-Smith, 2012). 
All together there are 9 interviews with 10 participants conducted in this research: 4 from 
Statoil, 2 from ENI Norge, 1 from The Norwegian Police, 1 from DNV-GL, and 1 from 
Acona. The two oil companies were chosen based on their current and future present in the 
Barents Sea, Statoil with its fields Snøhvit and Johan Castberg and ENI Norge with its Goliat 
field. We saw the need of interviewing several employees within the same company due to 
the broad roles and responsibility area within each oil company.  
In Statoil 2 out of the 4 participants are anonymous and are called Participant 1 and 
Participant 2 further in this thesis. The two other participants are from Statoil’s safety and 
sustainability apartment in the Harstad office, where Lill Harriet Brusdal is manager and 
Gunn Stabell is team leader. Lill Harriet is an earlier offshore installation manager and gave 
us relevant information in terms of managerial roles in crisis situation, while Gunn Stabell 
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gave us more general information on how the preparedness management and crisis 
management systems functions.  
From ENI Norge the two representatives that are located in Stavanger, are from the HSEQ 
apartment, where Liv Nielsen is manager and Ellen Waldeland is advisor. The interview with 
Liv Nilsen was done early on in the research, which makes the questions, and discussions 
here quit different from our second interview with Ellen Waldeland. In the interview with Liv 
Nielsen a general introduction was given on the topic, what areas that were possible to 
examine further and what areas that was restricted. In the interview with Ellen Waldeland a 
more detailed description was given of the preparedness system and the processes that were 
done within the company and with other actors to prepare and handle crisis situations.  
The Police are in charge when a crisis situation takes place and is an important participant to 
interview in terms of their role and how they operate during a crisis situation. Also how the 
police practice and set up exercises were asked. The person who was interviewed was the 
police inspector Per Jacob Solhaug, who works as a liaison for the Police at the Norwegian 
joint Headquartes at Reitan. He therefor also provides us with relevant information about 
whole national preparedness system.  
A representative from PSA was also interviewed. The PSA are the governmental regulator 
with responsibility of safety, emergency, preparedness and the working environment in the 
Norwegian petroleum industry (Petroleumtilsynet, 2014a). They are an important participant 
to interview in terms on how they work to secure oil installations against attacks, such as 
terrorism, and how they regulate and test the oil companies preparedness systems.  
One representative from the company Acona, providing service and competence to petroleum 
companies, was interviewed. Kurt Andreas Skog is senior advisor within Acona and gave us 
relevant information on how they work with petroleum companies and with other actors to 
prevent, prepare and handle crisis situations.  
Also one represent from DNV-GL was interviewed. Jon Jerre is positioned as associate 
director within the oil and gas sector and was able to provide us with relevant information on 
those areas where they implement own models and systems to help petroleum companies 
improve their existing security, preparedness and crisis systems.  
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Name Position Company Place Interview 
type 
Date Time 
Per Jacob 
Solhaug 
Ass. Cheif of 
Police  
Police liaison 
Officer to the 
Norwegian Joint 
headquarters  
Bodø Face-to-face 18.02.14 13.00-14.00 
Liv Nielsen HSEQ 
Manager 
ENI Norge  Bodø Face-to-face 20.02.14 16.30-17.15 
Lill Harriet 
Brusdal 
Manager 
safety and 
sustainability 
Statoil  Bodø Face-to-face 19.03.14 12.30-13.30 
Anthoni 
Larsen 
Senior advisor PSA (Ptil) Stavanger Face-to-face 25.03.14 11.30-12.30 
Ellen 
Waldeland 
HSEQ Advisor ENI Norge  Stavanger Face-to-face 25.03.14 14.00-15.30 
Gunn 
Stabell 
Team leader 
safety and 
sustainability 
Statoil  Bodø Phone 27.03.14 10.00-11.00 
Jon Jerre Associate 
Director Oil 
and Gas Sector 
DNV-GL  Høvik Face-to-face 10.04.14 14.00-15.30 
Kurt 
Andreas 
Skog 
Senior Advisor ACONA Stavanger Face-to-face 11.04.14 10.00-11.30 
Participant 
1&2  
 Statoil   Face-to-face 11.04.14 14.00-15.30 
Figure 7 - Overview of the interview participants 
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3.4 Data Analysis 
The empirical data collected in this research project has been collected through semi-
structured interviews. The interviews have been recorded and transcribed into text by an 
external person. Together the transcription from the 9 interviews consisted of 165 pages. This 
is a large amount of secondary data collected, where irrelevant information needed to be 
cleaned out. While reading through the interviews important and new material quotations 
were marked in different colours between the participants. This was done to distinguish the 
different participants and give a better overview and understanding on what areas and 
opinions the different participants covered. This was also done so the participant themselves 
could approve the quotations in the thesis by looking at their own colour.  
The written interviews were looked through several times to make sure that the correct data 
was collected and that no parts where missing. The data used from the interviews was then 
implemented into the data chapter where the material is divided between the same four 
themes as in the interview guide. There will therefore only be one data chapter covering both 
primary and secondary data that are further analysed in the “data analysis” chapter. 
3.5 Reliability and validity 
In a research project the validity and reliability of the work done needs to be evaluated. 
Easterby-Smith (2012 p.347) defines validity as “the extent to which measures and research 
findings that provide accurate representation of the things they are supposed to be 
describing”. For the research to be valid it is important to use the most appropriate methods 
to collect and analyse the data. Validity also covers the fact that the findings and results need 
to be valid enough to be used in other contexts and settings. Reliability says something about 
if a research project will produce the same results and scores as another research project 
carried out the same basis. In most cases it would be unlikely to have the same results 
performing the same study under similar conditions and circumstances (Easterby-Smith, 
2012).  
Attention needs to be given to reliability and validity to avoid errors. Errors can occur due to 
human mistakes such as poor choice of methods, choosing wrong samples and wrongly 
interpretation of data. One-way of evaluating this is to through internal validity asking critical 
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questions such as: Are the right questions asked? Is the information given trustworthy? Are 
the respondent’s chosen the right ones? External validity can be asked in terms of: Does the 
data change if other participants were chosen? If the interviews were done differently or other 
methods were used would the outcome be different?  
In this research project the interview guides are based on a throughout examination of primary 
data and the participants background, knowledge and roles. The participants gave feedback 
stating that our topic and questions was up to date and highly important. There are no signs 
showing that any doubt should be put on the respondent’s statements and information. Due to 
the research large collection of secondary data and the variety of actors, with different roles 
and perspectives, this sets a strong confidant that the results would still be the same if some of 
the interview participants and methods changed. 
For the research to be reliable the researchers themselves needs to do honest, present the data 
in a logical way and interpret the data correctly. The total picture illustrates that the interview 
participants seemed very confident on how the processes and systems that were asked for 
functioned, and that these descriptions would not change drastically with other interview 
participants. The only thing that could be a problem in terms of reliability is if the researchers 
themselves interpret the information shared differently the outcome would be so too.   
3.6 Ethical considerations  
When conducting a research project ethical issues need to be considered during the process 
and after. There has been a pressure from several academics and organizations to adapt 
definite ethical codes and practices, where they have tried to establishment a common set of 
principles. Bell and Bryan (2007) have made a list of 10 ethical principles that researcher 
should follow. The first seven ones are about protecting the interests of the research 
participants such as: no harm should come to them, respect their dignity, inform them fully 
about the research, protection of privacy, ensure confidentiality, protect their anonymity, and 
to avoid deception. The last three focus on ensuring that the data collected is accurate and that 
the research lack bias through: avoid conflicts of interest, be honest and transparent and to 
make sure the research is not misleading (Easterby-Smith, 2012). In terms of protecting the 
interest of the participants and organization we have informed and asked for permission to 
tape the interviews. All our participants have agreed upon this, but have informed clearly that 
some names and organizations and particular information will be excluded due to the taping. 
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Not the tapes itself, but the written material used from the interview tapes have been sent to 
the participants for them to confirm if the material can be published or not. In our research we 
do not have any intentions of setting any of the participants or organizations in a bad light. 
Even though we as researchers are in control of the data obtained from the interviews, we are 
not publishing any data that can harm any of the organizations interviewed, especially the 
smaller ones (Easterby-Smith, 2012).  
We have respect and understanding of the participant’s privacy, where we have kept some of 
the participants anonymous on their request. As researcher we seek to build strong 
relationships with our participants finding a balance satisfying both parts interests. 
Throughout the research and after the research we have obtained a critical role to our own 
research where we have thought, reflected and prepared critical questions about our own 
research related to ethics and politics. This critical role has made us more observant and better 
to introduce ethical guidelines for the research project.  
Summary 
In this chapter we have presented the methodological choices we have done before conducting 
our research. We first present the choice of philosophical position; the research design and 
how we are addressing our research problem. We then argue for the choice of qualitative 
research and in-depth interview as data collection method. The chapter gives an overview of 
how we have gathered both secondary and primary data. In addition we have evaluated the 
reliability and validity of the data collection in addition to ethical considerations along the 
way. The following chapter will give an overview of the data collected in this research.   
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4.0 Empirical data 
In this chapter we will present the empirical data, both secondary and primary data conducted 
in this research. The secondary data will be data that we have collected from reports, earlier 
studies, journals, articles etc. Information obtained from the interviews represents our primary 
data. This information is gathered from the participants: Statoil AS, ENI Norge AS, PSA 
(Ptil), The Norwegian Police, DNV-GL and ACONA AS. The list of participants is shown in 
the methodology chapter, and we refer to the participant with their last name, company and 
year in this chapter.  
The first subchapter is related to the oil companies preparedness system. In this chapter we 
present the main preparedness team, the 2nd line and the roles included here. In addition we 
present all the support lines around the preparedness team – and in that way present the whole 
system. We also present data related to how the team exercise, both internally but also with 
other actors.  
The second subchapter present data related to the Norwegian preparedness system. This 
chapter gives an introduction to the main laws and regulations the authorities sets for the oil 
companies operation on the NCS. We also present the different level in the national systems 
with different responsibilities during a crisis situation. We focus on the police preparedness 
system as they are they are responsible during a terrorist attack offshore on the NSC. In 
addition we have included some other external actors that has responsibilities due to prepare 
and handle terrorist attack.  
The third subchapter is related to the Barents Sea as a complex and turbulent environment. 
First we present how the development in the area changes the recent years. Then we provide 
an overview of the challenges in the area related to infrastructure, lack of installations and 
resources.  
The last subchapter, terrorism, gives an overview of the different views of what defines a 
terrorist. We present an overview of different factors that have changes the Norwegian terror 
threat picture, in addition to the different types of terror threats against offshore installations. 
Last we give an overview of how to asses the risk related to terrorism, and how the security 
culture within the oil companies has changes the recent years.  
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4.1 The preparedness organization: 1st, 2nd and 3rd line 
preparedness teams 
The oil companies preparedness system is regulated by Norwegian laws and frameworks, 
where the Petroleum Act chapter 9 specifies requirement for security (Olje- og 
energidepartementet, 2004). The main requirements important for this thesis is: 
Petroleum Act § 9.2: “Licensees shall at all times maintain effective emergency preparedness 
and are obliged to prevent or reduce harmful effects. The Ministry may issue new rules 
related to preparedness and measures, including required cooperation between several 
licensees” (Justis og beredskapsdepartementet, 2013 (4)).  
Petroleum act §9-3: “The oil companies are required to implement and maintain safeguards to 
help prevent deliberate attacks on installations and always have preparedness plans in case of 
attacks” (Justis og beredskapsdepartementet, 2013 (4)).  
Petroleum Act § 9-4: The petroleum installations on the Norwegian continental shelf follow 
several provisions of UNCLOS. Article 60 cf Article 80 nr 5 stipulates that: “establishment of 
safety zones around offshore installations that are not exceed 500 meters." With that 
limitation, the operators on the Norwegian continental shelf are required to establish safety 
zones, and these are in practices of 500 meters (Justis og beredskapsdepartementet, 2013 (4)).  
The goal of a company’s preparedness strategy is to prevent, limit and deal with crisis 
situations. Preparedness is all technical, operational and organisational measures which 
prevent danger and threats from developing into crisis situations and the process of reducing 
and preventing damages from escalating when a crisis has occurred (Njå, 1998). Thereafter 
the petroleum company define potential threat and accidents situations that the preparedness 
system needs to prepare for (Eriksen, 2011). There are different ways for the oil companies 
can conduct a list of potential crisis scenarios:  
1. Defines situations of hazard and accidents (DSHA) 
This method is the most common in the Norwegian petroleum industry, defining adverse 
events through risk analysis, experience and qualified evaluations (Njå, 1998).  
2. Worst case 
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•  Technical	  damage	  control	  •  Rescue	  	  1st	  line	  preparedness	  	  Operative	  
•  Tactical	  guidance	  •  Resource	  support	  2nd	  line	  preparedness	  Tactical	  
•  Strategic	  support	  •  Communication	  	  3rd	  line	  preparedness	  Strategic	  
This method focus on extreme conditions in a preparedness situation, and often includes 
several attacks at once representing crisis situations that are more difficult for the 
preparedness system to handle than DSHA. Worst case scenarios are defined without direct 
use of risk analysis, but where indicative information is used instead (Njå, 1998).   
3. Class of situation  
This method categorize and classifies different situations without focusing on inspections 
details (Njå, 1998).   
4.1.1 Organization of the oil companies preparedness system  
The oil companies are responsible to prepare for crisis situations within all of their operations 
and activities. The structure of the preparedness system may vary between the petroleum 
organizations, but they all consist of a 1st, 2nd and 3rd line preparedness team as Illustrated in 
figure (Njå, 1998):  
 
 
 
  
 
Figure 8 - Different organizational levels in the preparedness system (STATOIL, 2012) 
 
The 1st line preparedness team is the operative team on the platform or installations during the 
crisis situation (Njå, 1998). They focus mainly on the technical damage control and rescue of 
personnel. Their main responsibility is to implement measures on the installation during the 
crisis situation (Sommer, 2013).  
The 2nd line preparedness team represent the tactical level supporting the 1st line with 
resources and guidance, assisting the 1st line to solve the crisis situation (Sommer, 2013). The 
2nd line also coordinates all arrangements with the 1st line, authority and other preparedness 
participants within the organization (Njå, 1998). 
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The 3rd line preparedness team is the strategic support during a crisis situation mainly 
(Sommer, 2013). The 3rd line represent the main office or head quarter of the petroleum 
organization and have the responsibility of coordinating economical, legal and political 
questions (Njå, 1998).  
4.1.2 1st line preparedness team 
The 1st line preparedness team are located in the crisis situation and represents the 
preparedness system on the oil installations (Waldeland, Eni Norge, 2014). The managerial 
roles within the 1st line preparedness team are presented in the figure below:  
 
Figure 9 - Organization of 1st line preparedness team (Haug, 2011 p.7) 
The 1st line preparedness team on an oil installation has different roles and responsibilities. 
The structured of these roles are fixed representing permanent team roles with given 
responsibilities on the installations (Brusdal, Statoil, 2014).  
The offshore installation manager (OIM) is the person in charge on the platform during a 
crisis situation. The OIM is responsible of informing and to update this information during the 
crisis situation to the rest of the 1st line team members (Stabell, Statoil, 2014). In addition the 
OIM is responsible of communicating with the 2nd line preparedness team onshore (Brusdal, 
Statoil, 2014). When a crisis situation occurs the OIM is in charge takes the final decisions.  
1st	  line	  preparedness	  team	  
Offshore	  installation	  manager	  
Technological	  assistant	  from	  the	  platform	  stab	   Company	  representative	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The OIM needs to have good communication, collaboration skills able to take decisions under 
pressured situations. The manager needs to ensure that the team functions optimal and needs 
to gain trust from its team members taking decisions on the behalf of the team. To be a good 
OIM you must be able to plan, inform, control, support, implement and evaluate. The OIM 
needs to take decisions based on own judgment and knowledge and input from the other team 
members (Skog, Acona, 2014). These decisions need to be taken during stressful situations at 
the right time (Stabell, Statoil, 2014).  
In addition there is a member of the platform stab that are required to assist with technical 
installation knowledge during a crisis situation. This knowledge should make the OIM 
capable of mapping out where the crisis situation is located on the platform and what potential 
threats this crisis can cause and how to solve it. This manager also advises the OIM on what 
and when to shut down parts of the production (Brusdal, Statoil, 2014). 
Also there is one member responsible for the blackboard located in the response centre on the 
platform. This person is responsible to write every action that is going to be performed during 
the crisis. Each action is given a deadline and a time for it to be performed. This information 
is visible for everyone within the preparedness room. The blackboard is photographed as a 
documentation of what has been said and agreed upon. Who the blackboard responsible is 
varies between the platforms, but in most cases there is one from the platform management 
group (Brusdal, Statoil, 2014). 
In addition to the 2nd line preparedness team, the 1st line preparedness team has other support 
functions during a crisis situation such as: The Joint Rescue Control Centre (JRCC), standby 
vessels, other ships in the area, other offshore installations, medical team and helicopter 
services (Haug, 2011). 
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2nd	  line	  preparedness	  team	  	  
Action	  manager	  
Media	  handling	   Authority	   Environment	   Duty	  ofLicer	   Logistics	  and	  resources	  	   Personnel	  care	  
4.1.3 2nd line preparedness team 
The 2nd line preparedness team function as a  support line for the 1st line preparedness team. 
The 2nd line preparedness team is the team we refer to as “preparedness team and its 
managerial roles” further on in the study. The main responsibilities within the 2nd line team 
are the coordinate of actions that should be taken, and what resources and allocation of these 
resources assisting the 1st line and the crisis situation. They will support the 1st line 
preparedness team with obtaining additional resources, handling media and relatives, 
managing the operation and notifying other partners, government and contractors (Waldeland, 
Eni Norge, 2014). The following roles within the 2nd line preparedness team are illustrated in 
the figure bellow:  
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
Figure 10 - Organization of 2nd line preparedness team (Haug, 2011 p.7) 
The oil companies 2nd line team has a broad responsibility and should be prepared to handle 
all potential crisis situations. The 2nd line preparedness team consists of approximately 70-80 
members, with different background, depending on the size of the oil company. Every 
manager is in a way a specialist in their role, but they are all part of a team that work together 
and takes decisions together. There are few decisions that are taken individually by each 
member (Waldeland, Eni Norge, 2014). 
The action manager is the commander and leader of the whole preparedness team and has the 
authority from the director of the company to handle a crisis situation. This authority includes 
taking decisions at any cost to secure that the situation is handled properly. The main task for 
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the action manager is to keep an overview off the situation, coordinate all the actors and 
develop strategies to handle the situation. In addition the action manager is responsible for 
providing necessary information and updates to the 3rd preparedness team (ENINorge, 2012).  
The media handler/coordinator is responsible for the companies’ media strategy and 
statements that should be released to the press. The media coordinator has the main 
responsibility to provide the leader of the media group in the 3rd line with the necessary 
information (ENINorge, 2012). The 2nd line team also has a call centre to handle phone calls 
from the press, where the media group will only have a limited picture of the situation and 
only see what the company wants to release to the public (Stabell, Statoil, 2014). 
The authority response is responsible for notifying the authority and licence partners with 
updated information at regular intervals. They are also responsible for writing a report to PSA 
after a situation is over (ENINorge, 2012).   
The environmental role is responsible of giving instructions to an environmental group on 
what actions that needed to be done to prevent oil spills and other environmental damages 
during the crisis situation. The manager are responsible for the dialogue with NOFO and the 
costal guard (ENINorge, 2012) (Waldeland, Eni Norge, 2014). 
The duty officer is are responsible of communicating with other actors, such as drilling 
supervisors, during the crisis situation (ENINorge, 2012). The duty officer is characterized as 
a person with long experience from the industry and within offshore operations with good 
knowledge on understanding the circumstances on the platform during a crisis situation 
(Waldeland, Eni Norge, 2014). 
The resources manager is also responsible of having contact with the JRCC and contract 
companies during the crisis situation (ENINorge, 2012). Some oil companies have two 
resource managers one responsible for helicopters and one for vessels. The managers have 
authority to obtain the necessary recourses regardless of the amount of money, and if they 
require assistant from JRCC they will get that immediately (Stabell, Statoil, 2014). 
The next-of-kin manager is responsible of providing information and to ensure that the 
families and friends of those offshore personnel that are threatened during the crisis situation 
gets the assistant needed (ENINorge, 2012). 
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In addition to these roles some companies has their own IT and Telecom manager who are 
responsible for solving any problems along the way. The manager will also be responsible for 
logging and writing reports from the meetings. There will also in some companies be one 
person responsible of updating the blackboard at all times (ENINorge, 2012). 
The 2nd line have a support network during a crisis situation includes actors such as: the 
Police, the military, PSA, the coast guard, medical services, JRCC, NOFO and the owner of 
the rig (Haug, 2011). 
There are no templates for the managers of the 2nd line preparedness team, but all the 
managers’ needs to function together as a team.  The common denominator for all the roles in 
the 2nd line preparedness system is that they all have experience from crisis situations and 
good understanding of how the situation looks like on a platform during a crisis situation 
(Waldeland, Eni Norge, 2014). 
The first thing that happens when the preparedness team gathers, in the 2nd line preparedness 
room, is to assess the situation based on the information available. Understanding the 
situation is the first task in any preparedness situation, and it is important that the whole team 
understands what is really happening. Then the team evaluate a worst-case scenario for the 
situation and where all members focus on providing necessary resources to solve that 
scenario. After the first meeting the team provides a meeting discussing changes that have 
taken place along the way. This ensures that all the team members have a common understand 
of the situation facing them so that they can further work towards common goals and 
strategies to solve the crisis situation (Waldeland, Eni Norge, 2014). 
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4.1.4 3rd line preparedness team 
The 3rd line team is the highest preparedness level and their main task is to quality assure the 
2nd line preparedness team and ensure access and necessary knowledge during the crisis 
situation. In addition the 3rd line is normally responsible for handling the media during a crisis 
situation (Waldeland, Eni Norge, 2014). 
 
Figure 11 - Organization of 3rd line preparedness team (Haug, 2011 p.7) 
The 3rd line preparedness team, the strategic level, is responsible for the company’s policy and 
to handle the organizations reputation during and after the crisis situation. This responsibility 
should not be outsourced (Skog, Acona, 2014).    
The preparedness coordinator manager is responsible for notifying the leader in the oil 
companies and other stakeholder about the situation. The manager also needs to ensure that 
the 1st and 2nd lines have the necessary information and expertise available to solve the 
situation (Stabell, Statoil, 2014).   
The media team manager is the leader of the media-handling group and controls the media 
outflow during the crisis situation. The media group’s main responsibility is to prepare press 
release, hold press conferences and answer calls from the media (Waldeland, Eni Norge, 
2014). 
The oil companies wish to start up normal process as soon as possible after a crisis situation. 
For this process to be successful the petroleum companies need to hinder damages of their 
reputation. This is highly dependent on how the company handles media, in terms of 
information during the crisis situation and after. Their reputation also depends on how the 
crisis situation was handled and how well prepared they were (Waldeland, Eni Norge, 2014). 
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4.1.5 External actors  
It is resource intensive for many oil companies to establish a preparedness system with good 
quality that are available at all time. It is also expensive to develop and maintain a 
preparedness organization, and many organizations therefore choose to outsource some or the 
whole preparedness system to external actors. The external actors then function as a support 
line for the petroleum companies (DetNorske, 2010). 
Acona is one external actor offering preparedness solutions for oil companies, rig owners and 
service companies. Some of these customers buy the whole preparedness package and others 
just pick some of the services such as media centre and next of kin. Acona has three identical 
emergency rooms and are able to handle several situations simultaneously. The oil companies 
can use their emergency facilities for meetings with their 3rd line preparedness team, where 
they also get access to Acona’s crisis emergency tool (CIM). Acona also offers their 
customers an administrative representative providing assistance during a crisis situation 
(Skog, Acona, 2014).   
Most of the larger oil companies have an in house preparedness organization, but they can 
still outsource parts of the preparedness system. This means that there are even more actors 
involved in the crisis situation. The operating company always has the overall responsibility 
for health, safety and environment and it is extremely important for a company that delivers 
preparedness services to have exercises with their costumers to be able to know their roles 
and responsibilities in a crisis situation (Skog, Acona, 2014).   
Acona can offer a complete 2nd line preparedness solution to the oil companies, where the 1st 
line on the platform notifies them during a crisis situation. The operator has the overall 
responsibility in a crisis situation, which requires a close cooperation between the Acona and 
the oil companies. Acona can represent both the rig and the operator and solve this with two 
parallel preparedness organizations. “Handling both the operator and the rig owner is one of 
the toughest, demanding and challenging situations for Acona” (Skog, Acona, 2014).   
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4.1.6 Exercises within the preparedness team   
The oil companies are required to practice on every DSHA that they have listed in their 
preparedness plan and PSA supervise if the companies do this in practice (Larsen, PSA, 
2014). It is important to not underestimate the importance of performing exercise.  Events 
such as the 22th of July show how prepared the Norwegian health service was to handle the 
situation, because they have conducted exercises and were well prepared to handle different 
situations (Nielsen, ENI Norge, 2014). The Norwegian health care has more complex and 
organized exercises where they practice more across different actors and scenarios. The 
operators on the NCS can learn from the importance of the interplay and distribution of roles 
between the different operators in crisis situations (Brundtland, 2013).  
The regulations for the oil companies’ state that they should continuously improve everything 
they do, and this is especially important related to security. This is on of the main reason for 
why the companies use so much time on exercises and evaluation of the results (Waldeland, 
Eni Norge, 2014). 
The operating oil company must define every event that the company needs to protect oneself 
against. This collection of possible events is called defined situations of hazard and accident 
(DSHA) and is the basic for the planning of preparedness exercise. Not all oil companies and 
installations have the same DSHA, where each DSHA are customized to the installation based 
on the organizations capacity (PTIL, 2013). The oil companies work systematic related to 
DSHA where they first identify the relevant DSHA for the platform, then do a preparedness 
analysis which states how to handle the situation and last evaluate how the situation can 
escalate. Then the oil company decides how to exercise on the DSHA, to test how prepared 
they are, alone or in cooperation with other actors. The oil companies have both internal 
exercises with the different preparedness lines and external exercises where they invite other 
actors to participate such as the police (Waldeland, Eni Norge, 2014).Terrorist attack is one of 
the DSHA, which means that the oil companies are required to exercise and develop expertise 
to be prepared for this situation (Participant 1&2, Statoil, 2014).   
An oil platform can have 17 different DSHA and every 14 day the 1st line preparedness team 
practice on a DSHA, regulated by a rotation system. This means that they go through every 
DSHA several times every year. The 1st line preparedness team also have tabletop exercises 
the other week, focusing on discussing how to solve different situations. Each year there will 
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also be a verification exercise, where the oil company choose on DSHA that they need to 
practice on and external actors evaluate and verify the company after the exercise (Stabell, 
Statoil, 2014). 
The 2nd line team practice on every DSHA, but they don’t focus so much on the DSHA 
because the organization will remain the same independent of the crisis situation. Therefore 
the exercises in the 2nd line team focus more on communication and collaboration internally in 
the team and cooperation with the other lines in the preparedness system (Waldeland, Eni 
Norge, 2014). 
The 3rd line team have strategically exercises, where they focus on the different roles and 
responsibilities during a crisis situation. Individuals need to know their responsibility, for the 
leader to be able to manage the situation (Skog, Acona, 2014).   
One of the main challenges related to exercises is that the oil companies don’t have the time 
and money to practice as much as they want, with all the actors who will be present during a 
real situation. A full-scale exercise requires a lot of resources and many operators has to 
prioritize some exercises to participate in (Waldeland, Eni Norge, 2014). 
After an exercise it is important that the oil companies evaluate each of the roles in the team 
and write an evaluation report for further learning. It is important to evaluate the time aspect 
of the exercise, the resources that was used and communication along the way (Brusdal, 
Statoil, 2014). 
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4.2 The Norwegian preparedness system: an integrated system 
with several actors  
The petroleum industry is the largest industry in Norway, where oil and gas activities 
accounts for the largest value creation. Norway was ranked the 4th largest exporter of oil in 
2009, the 14th largest producer of oil in 2013 and the 3rd largest gas exporter in 2007 
(Australian Government, 2012). 
The Norwegian petroleum industry has moved from strict regulations and inspections by the 
Norwegian Government, to a more self-regulated system in terms of safety and security. 
Today Norwegian oil companies are responsible for the safety and security of their own 
operations and activities, and are required to implement crisis and preparedness management 
systems. Inspections still take place, but in an environment where the whole responsibility 
lays on the oil companies. The oil companies need to show how they will manage their 
systems and operations in a safe and secure way, where all specifications are clarified and 
operational processes are closely monitored. The aim of investigations done by the 
Government is to investigate what went wrong and to improve the current systems (Australian 
Government, 2012).  
The Norwegian preparedness system is highly influenced and dominated by comprehensive 
laws and regulations, where the government allocates the petroleum resources. One of 
Norway’s biggest strengths in the petroleum sector is the competence and knowledge about 
offshore operations in harsh climates. This is something the Norwegian government intends to 
further build on in the future (DNV, 2012).  
The legal framework is set to maintain safe and secure business operations on the NCS 
(Australian Government, 2012). The national social security and emergency preparedness is 
based on the principles: responsibility, equality and subsidiary, introduced in the white paper 
no. 17 (2000-2002).  
The principle of responsibility states that the ministry, enterprise or government agency is 
responsible for security in their area, including emergency preparations and executive service 
of crisis and disasters. The minister is responsible for all activities under his agency, including 
maintaining planning functions within their area (Justis- og beredskapsdepartementet, 2012).  
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The principle of equality states that the organizational form during a crisis should be as 
similar as possible to daily operations. The principle is an elaboration of the principle of 
responsibility, where responsibility within organizations and medium enterprises shall not be 
changed due to crisis management (Justis- og beredskapsdepartementet, 2012). 
The principle of subsidiary states that crises should be handled at the lowest possible level, 
where the county and municipality have important roles. Those who are closest to the crisis 
will usually be the ones who have the best position to understand the situation and are also 
best suited to handle it. The principle of subsidiary does not apply to security crises such as a 
terrorist attacks (Justis- og beredskapsdepartementet, 2012). 
These principles have proved to be adequate, but struggle to communicate and interact 
between the various responsible shareholders, which makes it difficult to see the community’s 
total resource context. Experience from recent incidents show the importance of all 
stakeholders working together to solve the crisis in the best way. Criticism from research has 
stated that it has been to little emphasize on the requirement of good cooperation between the 
different shareholders.  To ensure better cooperation, the Norwegian government has decided 
that the cooperative principle should be incorporated as a fundamental element in line with 
the existing policies (Justis- og beredskapsdepartementet, 2012).  
The cooperative principles state that the authority, the enterprise or agency are responsible for 
ensuring the best possible synergies with relevant shareholders and agencies in the 
prevention, preparedness and crisis management phases (Justis- og beredskapsdepartementet, 
2012). 
The preparedness management system covers crisis related to both safety and security. There 
are no clear definitions of safety and security because of the high uncertainty and complexity 
related to the events. In this study we seek to clarify the difference between safety and 
security based on the definitions by Midttun (2013). Safety is defined as “The risks within the 
company, where hazards and accidents results from own activities”. Security on the other 
hand is defined as “The threat from external actors, where attacks and events are caused 
intentionally by external actors, wanting to spread harm and fear”. This study examines the 
preparedness systems in the light of extreme terrorist threats as a part of security and therefore 
excludes the most of the safety part.   
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The authorities and the petroleum companies have more experience from safety issues than 
security. Safety has been the main focus for many years, while security is only in the start 
phase. Most of the initiatives to increase the focus on security come from the petroleum 
companies themselves. The petroleum companies see the importance of it and that security 
threats are closer to them than first thought. Security has been given a higher level of 
awareness and attention in the petroleum industry after the In Amenas terrorist attack. This is 
reflected through a higher demand from customers wanting consulting within security. 
Security has been on the agenda for some years, but more in terms of IT security, both 
internal and external information. It has also been a part of the PSTs threat evaluation for 
many years (Jerre, DNV-GL, 2014).  
 “Security is everyone´s responsibility and companies who do not invest in 
preparedness, don’t know about protecting the people and the value of the 
environment and the assets” (Nielsen, ENI Norge, 2014).   
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Political level 
• Norwegian Government 
Strategic level 
• Ministry 
Operational level 
• The Police Directorate 
Tactical level 
• The Police district 
4.2.1 Managerial levels in the Norwegian preparedness system 
There are several institutions and companies involved in the Norwegian preparedness system. 
The actors cooperate and divide roles between them to prepare and handle crisis situations. 
During a crisis situation there are four managerial level divided among the actors (Politiet, 
2011) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 12 - The managerial levels in the Norwegian preparedness system (Politiet, 2011 
pp. 30-32) 
Political level: 
The Norwegian Government is the highest political organ in the preparedness system, and is 
rapid summoned during a crisis situation. The Norwegian government policy related to 
preparedness is to ensure equal living conditions in all parts of the country. The Governments 
Security Committee (RSU) considers matters of defence and security political character. The 
Committee members can vary between the different ministries, but the Prime Minster, 
Foreign Minister, Defence Minister, Justice Minister and Finance Minister are permanent 
members of the security board (Politiet, 2011). 
The Norwegian Government is responsible for handling a crisis situation such as terrorist 
attacks, which requires coordination of management, communication and awareness. The 
Government strengthen the police’s crisis management capacity, but the police are still 
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dependent on other preparedness resources such as military forces and private companies. At 
a national level the government’s main task is to exploit and control the local police so they 
can quickly respond to a crisis situation (Justis og beredskapsdepartementet, 2013 (4)).   
After the 22th of July terror attack the Norwegian government presented a new strategy in 
their white paper focusing on the follow up the experience and potential for further 
improvements due to combating terrorist attacks. The paper presents an overall strategy 
against terrorism, with a number of specific measures called “Measures against terror - for a 
safer Norway” (Minister, 2013). The government’s main task related to terrorist attacks is 
based on five goals:  
1. Preventing radicalization and violent extremism 
2. Cooperate internationally to prevent and combat terrorists 
3. Prevent and detect acts of terror2ism before they take place 
4. Protect the community and make it prepared for terrorist attacks 
5. Manage terrorist attacks in the best possible way  
Strategic level: 
The Norwegian Ministries represent the strategic level where each Ministry has their own 
preparedness plan and training to handle crisis situations within their area of responsibility. 
The Government Crisis Committee strengthens the cooperation between the Ministries when 
needed. When no Ministry in charge are selected The Ministry of Justice automatically takes 
the managing role in the crisis situation (Politiet, 2011). 
The responsible Ministry shall compile the overall threat situation and present it to the 
political level as a decision foundation. The Ministry needs to make sure the media and the 
society are informed, coordinate activities with other departments and ensure that the 
necessary measures are done within the responsibility areas (Politiet, 2011). 
The Government's Crisis Council (RKR) provides strategic coordination in complicated crisis, 
and there is a low threshold to convene the Crisis Council. The main tasks is to evaluate 
questions about the leading Ministry, ensuring high quality coordination actions, and ensure 
clear and coordinated information to the media and the society (Politiet, 2011). 
The Government's Crisis Support Unit (KSE) functions as an administrative resource for the 
Ministries and the Government's Crisis Council in crisis situations. They work as a daily 
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support and assist unit in preparedness, but are not a part of the principle of responsibility, and 
does not cover any of the Ministries responsibilities (Politiet, 2011). 
Operational level: 
The National Police Directorate, representing the operational level, is the superior authority 
for the police districts and special agencies. Despite this the Police Chiefs and the 
Commanders have independent responsibility to carry out the police tasks (Politiet, 2011). 
The Police Directorate is responsible for the daily police management process. During a crisis 
situation they give operational commands to the strategic level, and coordinate the police 
chiefs and commanders that are affected. They also ensure that personnel and material 
resources are available. The Directorate collects the processed information from the tactical 
level, coordinating cooperation with other actors on the operational level and prepare 
situational reports to the Ministry of Justice. The JRCC and The Police Security Service are a 
part of the operational level (Politiet, 2011). 
Tactical level: 
The Police Districts and The Specialized Agencies together constitute the tactical level. The 
Police have an important role in the regional preparedness management and needs to 
collaborate with several actors. The Police are entitled to connect with advisories and liaisons 
from other agencies and businesses. The Police Chief is responsible for the police in its own 
police district (Politiet, 2011).  
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4.2.2 The Norwegian police preparedness responsibility    
In Norway the police are responsible of preventing and combating terrorism, which requires 
law enforcement and personnel with sufficient expertise. The police’s terror preparedness is 
based on framework from the police directorate and the Police Act. Preparedness against 
terrorist attacks, require coordination effort involving several players such as the police, 
emergency service, military force and the owner of the infrastructure (Politiet, 2011). 
The police are in charge of protecting national resources and the main political centre is 
located in Oslo, the main reason for this is that Oslo is the capital and need extra protection. 
Oslo as the main region has a higher concentration of police officer and resources in terms of 
the numbers of police per capita. The devices with national responsibility such as the 
emergency squad and criminal police are also situated in Oslo (Ulriksen, 2013). 
The Norwegian Police Service is a department of the Royal Norwegian Ministry of Justice 
and Police. The department consists of twenty-seven regional areas and seven national police 
districts (Australian Government, 2012). Only four of these districts, Stavanger, Kristiansund, 
Nordland and Troms have oil and gas facilities and are responsible for the security on these 
(Justis og beredskapsdepartementet, 2013 (4)). The main oil and gas infrastructure is located 
in Rogaland Police district outside of Stavanger, and is therefore the main police district 
(Australian Government, 2012) 
The Norwegian police districts are autonomous units and vary in terms of available resources 
and how they prioritize the use of these. There is also a tremendous variety in terms of 
opportunities for quick assistance from the neighbouring district. There is no relationship 
between the police strength in an area and its economic importance. Compared to other 
countries such as the Scotland where the police and military protect important terminals and 
oil installations to secure due to energy security, the security of oil installations in Norway 
lays on the petroleum companies (Ulriksen, 2013).  
In addition to the ordinary 24/7-duty responsibility the Norwegian Police develop 
preparedness plans to handle extraordinary events and terror attacks. These plans help 
contribute to strong preparedness strategies that makes it possible for the Norwegian Police to 
adjust quickly and effectively in cooperation with national preparedness resources. It is the 
local police districts that are available during crisis situations such as a terrorist attack, and 
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must therefore have the capacity, expertise and equipment to ensure that the crisis can be 
resolved as well as possible in the initial phase (Politiet, 2011).  
A terrorist attack on an oil platform requires immediate response from the Norwegian Police 
and the goal for the police would always be to have as much time as possible to prepare for 
the situation. In some cases the police want to win time to prepare an action plan, be able to 
reach the necessary resources and actors to solve the situation (Solhaug, Poilce, 2014).  
The regional Police district will be responsible during a terrorist attack, but they will lack the 
equipment and capacity to handle the operation alone. The Police district in Oslo will be 
contacted, since they are responsible for the national resources such as bomb squad, 
emergency squad and the helicopter services. The Special Force will usually be sent out to the 
platform, since the emergency squad in Oslo are more trained onshore than offshore. The 
Special Force commander and its team will become a part of the team the Police Chief has 
established and are responsible for advising the military operations (Solhaug, Poilce, 2014). 
The Police districts will also notify the Norwegian Headquarters at Reitan during a terrorist 
attack, which will gather their military resources. In addition the military special force in 
Bergen who is experts on handling operations at sea and coastguard will be notified. Marine 
soldiers will be responsible for boarding the platform, and there is often a need for helicopter 
with trained pilots to fly during a terrorist attacks, if the terrorist are armed (Solhaug, Poilce, 
2014). 
The Norwegian Police have annual exercises with the military, police and the industry where 
it is required that the oil companies participate when they are asked to. Operators and owners 
of the facilities as participants are included in the planning of the security scenario and the 
actual exercise. The annual exercises switch between the four districts each year but since 
most of the petroleum facilities are located in the Rogaland district the exercises happens 
more frequently in this area. One of the main exercises held by the Norwegian Police, 
Gemini, is a complex exercise which requiring a lot of preparation and meetings ahead. The 
Gemini exercise is a terror exercise where the Norwegian army contributes with their special 
force and expertise due to counterterrorism. The Police are responsible for managing the 
whole exercise where the police chief in the area is the leader of the situation. This is a 
complex exercise where preliminary work starts a year in advance. In addition to the Gemini 
exercise the Norwegian police has a annual exercise called TYR, where the scenarios for the 
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exercise changes from everything from natural disasters to organized crime (Solhaug, Poilce, 
2014). 
After a exercise, such as Gemini, the PSA, the participants, the Police district and the industry 
do an evaluation of the exercise (Australian Government, 2012). The evaluation of the 
exercises will not have any value if the evaluation doesn’t get implemented into the 
preparedness system (Solhaug, Poilce, 2014). 
The Norwegian police collaborate with the oil companies due to preventing terrorist attack on 
the NCS, and the collaboration has been better the last years. One main reason for this is the 
employment of former police officer in the oil company’s security management apartment. 
This makes the security department automatically more aware of security and preparedness. 
Another reason is that the oil companies participate at the yearly Gemini exercise, where the 
numbers of oil companies that wants to participate has increases, and the police have to set 
some limits (Solhaug, Poilce, 2014). 
Even if the police are in charge during a terrorist attack on petroleum facilities, the oil and gas 
companies are responsible of making emergency preparedness system and to prevent terror 
attacks. The oil and gas companies goes through preparedness plans related to terror with the 
police, and they also have a close dialogue with the police chiefs with shelf responsibility  
(Nielsen, ENI Norge, 2014).   
If an oil company experience a terrorist attack on an oil platform the police and military are 
responsible for combating the attack “the oil companies don’t have the knowledge and 
resources to do that”(Stabell, Statoil, 2014).  But if a terrorist attack happens on a platform 
the oil companies has an important task through communicating and provide them with 
drawing and list of people present on the platform. Liaisons from the oil company can also 
assist the police due to technical aspect on the installation, where a liaison is obligated to 
meet, but not speak (Solhaug, Poilce, 2014). 
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4.2.3 Other actors and their preparedness responsibility    
The Petroleum Safety Authority Norway (PSA) is an independent government regulator, 
responsible for the regulation of safety, security, emergency preparedness and the working 
environment in the petroleum industry. The PSA set the required standards, and the oil 
companies are responsible for achieving them (Australian Government, 2012). The PSA main 
task is to monitor the oil companies preparedness management systems and follow up how the 
oil companies manage to prepare for major hazards and crises (Lieungh, 2013).  
PSA prioritize what is called functional regulations, where there are no clearly defined 
requirements but the oil companies need to find a way to ensure safety that works for their 
company. It is important to emphasise that PSA don’t give advise to what the oil companies 
should do, since PSA then will be guilty if something happens. The oil companies have to 
follow rules and regulations and PSA will supervise if the companies documented solutions 
are satisfying. PSA are organized under the ministry of labour and social affairs that each year 
writes an award letter that defines the areas PSA should focus on. The new focus area in 2014 
is to ensure safe operations in the Barents Sea (Larsen, PSA, 2014). 
Usually The PSA gives a three weeks notice before the supervisory inspections and audits. 
The oil companies are the ones responsible for paying the costs of the supervisory inspections 
and audits. The PSA is entitled to give advises on specific required actions, intervene in the 
daily process and to determine or suggest what actions the oil companies should take 
(Australian Government, 2012). 
The instrument PSA use during meetings, audits and verifications are dialog and if something 
is not good enough they have to take action. PSA was delegated authority for the Petroleum 
Act section 9.3, with responsibility for overseeing the oil industry in relation to intentional 
attacks (Larsen, PSA, 2014). 
As a supervisor PSA have a good relationship with the oil companies and all inspections are 
notified (Larsen, PSA, 2014). The oil companies have both in the planning phase and during 
an accident close dialogue with PSA, where PSA can advise and assist the oil companies in 
different ways (Brusdal, Statoil, 2014). The oil companies and PSA has a shared goal: to 
ensure safest possible activities (Waldeland, Eni Norge, 2014). 
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Armed Forces Special Command (FSK) was established due to the increased risk of 
terrorist attack against Norwegian interest, including offshore oil platforms.  The police chief 
who are responsible during a terrorist attack define the need for military support within the 
police framework. The practical part of this is regulated by the development assistance where 
the police chief sends a request for assistance to the Ministry of Justice through the Police 
Directorate. The Ministry of Justice consider, in consultation with the Police Directorate the 
request and the defence can then propose conditions to provide assistance. The special force 
cannot go into a police operation before there has been done a formal paper work, where the 
police chief sends a request for assistance. This is regulated by the constitution Article 99 in 
Norway, which state that the military forces shall not be used against civilians, a terrorist 
attack is an exception. This is regulated because Norway wants to have democratic political 
control over the military resources when it is used against civilian (Justis-og-
beredskapsdepartementet, 2004).  
After the 22th July there have been some changes in the aid instruction, to save time. Even if 
the chief must submit formal documents through the channels he shall notify the defence, so 
the time the politicians and ministries use to approve the documents the defence can use to 
gather forces and prepare for the situation (Solhaug, Poilce, 2014). 
The Norwegian police security service (PST) is a separate police agency administratively to 
the Ministry of Justice. Their main task is to advise the police district during a crisis situation. 
The Norwegian police security service prepares threat assessment and provides advice on 
measures to safeguard Norwegian interest. The threat assessment is evaluated in consultation 
with the police directorate, and the police chief in the area decided which actions that should 
be taken (Politiet, 2011).The oil companies addresses the information provided by the 
Norwegian police security service on counter terrorism and terror threats (Participant 1&2, 
Statoil, 2014).   
A new counter-terrorism centre is going to be established within the Norwegian Police 
Security service (PST) to strengthening the capacity and ability to share information about the 
terror threat. The Norwegian Intelligence Service (NIS) and the Norwegian Police Security 
Service (PST) collaborates on terrorism, PST is responsible for the national internal security 
and NIS is responsible for information about foreign states, organizations or individuals that 
is seen as a potential threat to the nation (Norwegian Directorate for Civil Protection, 2013). 
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The Norwegian Petroleum Directorate (NPD) is a specialist government directorate and 
administrative body that report to the Ministry of Petroleum and Energy. The main goal of 
NPD is to create and secure the greatest values for the society from oil and gas activities. This 
is done through efficient resource management in terms of safety, emergency preparedness 
and safeguarding the external environment. The Norwegian petroleum directorate are 
responsible for making recommendations to the Ministry of Petroleum and Energy on which 
companies that should be awarded licences, based on a comprehensive evaluation of the 
applicants (Oljedirektoratet, 2011).  
The Ministry of Defence is responsible for forming and implementing the Norwegian 
security and defence policy. The Ministry of Defence provides courses each year with focus 
on national security and safety policy. Governmental, parliamentary and industry participate 
in these courses and the industry represents normally 40-50% of the participants. The 
Ministry of Defence regulates exercises with the police and ensure good coordination between 
military and police personnel (Australian Government 2012). Not all operations have both 
military and police personnel, but if this is the case they should not be mixed. E.g. there 
should never be one from the military force and two from the police force representing one 
team. It should be a separated mission between the police and the military force, where the 
Police force is responsible of one floor on the platform, while the military force are 
responsible of another. These two forces should never be mixed and each force has their own 
commander of chief (Solhaug, Poilce, 2014). 
The main task of the Norwegian army, as one of the defence policy objectives in Norway, is 
to contribute to safeguard the Norwegian civilians by limit the consequences of accidents and 
attacks. The army provide assistance to the police in acute events such as terror, where they 
will help to prevent the damage on the country’s population, infrastructure and social 
functions (Politiet, 2011).  
The Directorate for Civil Protection (DSB) is a drive force to prevent accidents and to 
ensure efficient preparedness and crisis management. They have the overall coordination 
responsibility, especially coordination of activities, objects and organizations in case of terror 
attacks (Politiet, 2011).  
The Joint Rescue Coordination Centre (JRCC) has an overall operational responsibility 
during search and rescue operations and has two main centre located in Bodø and Sola (near 
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Stavanger). The centre is controlled and managed between the government, voluntary 
organizations and private companies, with necessary resources. When an accident takes place 
the JRCC are notified and will help the oil companies with evacuation and injured people. 
JRCC is responsible for all resources on land, offshore and in the air and the main reason why 
the oil companies notify JRCC is their need of SAR helicopters (Waldeland, Eni Norge, 
2014). 
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4.3 The Barents Sea: a complex and turbulent environment  
The last 20 years have been marked by a rapid development in the Barents Sea due to 
increased oil and gas discoveries with opening of new areas for petroleum activity. The 
Norwegian government states that this development will strengthen the long-term foundation 
of the Norwegian wealth creation, and are therefore important to protect. One way of 
strengthening the security of these petroleum installations is to build a robust preparedness 
system (Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2011).  
The Barents Sea is an exciting petroleum province creating diverse opportunities. The Arctic 
area is estimated to contain 13% of the world’s undiscovered oil (90 billion barrels of oil) and 
30% of its undiscovered gas (1670 trillion cubic feet). In 2013 The estimation prognoses by 
Rystad Energy states that the Arctic would provide 3% of the global petroleum in 2020 and 
9% in 2035 (Fisher, 2013). Today there are three fields located in the Norwegian Barents Sea 
that is either under production or planning to start up in the nearest future. These are Goliat 
field, Snøhvit field and Johan Castberg field (earlier Skrugard and Havis) and new fields are 
expected to emerge the next years (Atle, 2013). 
 
Figure 13 - Location of the Barents Sea, North Sea and Norwegian Sea (NPD, 2013)1 
                                                
1 http://www.npd.no/Global/Norsk/4-Kart/Sokkelkart2013/Sokkelkartet-2013.pdf 
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How the Barents Sea and the Arctic should be divided between Norway and Russia has not 
always been clear. After 40 years of boarder dispute the conflict was solved in 2010, and lead 
to the opening of oil exploration in the Barents Sea. The two countries signed a legal treaty 
dividing the arctic area equally between Russia’s Kola Peninsula and the Norwegian coast 
(Fischer, 2011). Several Russian and international petroleum companies have shown interest 
in the Barents Sea, and fields are under exploration on the Russian side as well (Paaske, 
2013). 
The Arctic’s resources have created a demand for new research for several countries. There 
are numbers of countries counting on exploration in the Arctic to strengthen their future 
energy security and shipping opportunities. Many of the actors wishing to operate in the 
Arctic works on improving the satellite data in the High North. Functional satellite data will 
contribute to improve the intelligence capacity in the Arctic region. Operators in the region 
needs to be aware of the increased activity from activists and where petroleum installations in 
the Barents Sea in the future will become potential intelligence activities. This regards also 
Norwegian scientific communities working on security within the High North (Alsen, 2013).  
It is required that the response and preparedness in the Barents Sea should be at least as good 
as the rest of the NCS (Olje-og-energidepartementet, 2003-2004). This is challenging due to 
the areas complex and turbulent environment. Oil and gas operators in the Barents Sea need to 
deal with harsh weather conditions such as sea ice, icebergs, darkness, low temperatures, 
polar low, wind and visibility. These challenges are related to safety preparedness that 
requires protection of personnel, installations, equipment and material properties (Paaske, 
2013). The main challenges related to security preparedness are the lack of infrastructure, 
facilities and resources (Henningsgård, 2013). 
“Even though the same requirements are set for those operating in the Barents Sea it 
is highly more difficult to meet these requirements in a complex and turbulent 
environment” (Larsen, PSA, 2014). 
The Norwegian military force raise concerns related to the challenges of a potential terror 
attack on Norwegian offshore installations in the Barents Sea. A terror attack offshore in the 
Barents Sea is close to the maximal capacity of what the Norwegian police and military is 
capable of delivering. Each year they practice on attacks like this. It is necessary with 
assistant from the Norwegian military during a terror attack offshore, due to their competence 
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and expertise of handling terror attacks offshore. The Norwegian police are more specialised 
and trained to handle terror attacks onshore then offshore. While that is said the military lack 
competence on several areas related to the offshore installations technology and other relevant 
aspects, where they are dependent on the oil and gas companies and their competence 
(Taraldsen, 2013). 
Large distances, few vessels and helicopters characterize the Barents Sea. The PSA is 
working on improving the preparedness system within the Barents Sea through emergency 
preparedness analyses and plans for activity. PSA will mainly focus on new regulations and 
the need for more rescue equipment. To meet these goal, collaboration between several parties 
are needed in the Barents Sea (Petroleumtilsynet, 2013 (2)). 
“Collaboration is the key to successful preparedness within the Barents Sea” 
(Petroleumtilsynet, 2013 (2)).  
Obligatory and specific cooperation frameworks needs to be built between the operators and 
the governmental authorities to conduct safe and secure operations, work for common 
solutions and new systems to meet the challenges in the Barents Sea (Petroleumtilsynet, 
2013).  
The preparedness team handling crisis situations in the Barents Sea should be both flexible 
and innovative, and at the same time have clear responsibilities, roles and tasks (Borch, 2013). 
They are dependent on the right skills, knowledge and competence to secure the installations 
during a crisis situation. There is no right answer to how a preparedness team should organize 
and control their preparedness system, but they should be prepared for unexpected events and 
worst-case scenarios. Even though there is a low probability for extreme events such as 
terrorism, the consequences of these extreme events could be tremendous (Borch, 2013). 
4.3.1 Infrastructure, installations and resources  
Logistics is defined as “the management of the flow of resources between a point of origin 
and the point of consumption” (Henningsgård, 2013 p.12). One way of studying the Barents 
Sea preparedness logistics is to look at its infrastructure, facilities and resources 
(Henningsgård, 2013).  
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The preparedness resources in the Barents Sea are limited, and cannot be compared to any 
other parts of the NCS. This is mainly due to lack of infrastructure, the lack of activity in the 
area and large distances for the preparedness resources to reach the crisis situation offshore. 
There are many actors operating during a crisis situation that needs to be correlated and 
collaborate. The long distance to shore also creates challenges related to communication and 
satellite availability during a preparedness situation  (Nielsen, ENI Norge, 2014). There is a 
lack of satellite communication, where there is no satellite capacity north of 75° and no 
geostationary satellite capacity north of 81,3° (Paaske, 2013).  
PSA is highly focus on facing the logistics challenges in the Barents Sea through 
collaboration between the actors in the area. PTIL states “solo games are out of the question 
when adapting to a new area, furthest north on the NCS” (PTIL, 2014b). Lack of 
infrastructure, logistic solutions and access to resources during a crisis situation can lead to 
tremendous consequences (Okstad, 2012). 
The Barents Sea boarders to the Finnmark County, an area characterized with large distances 
between its regions. This differs from other regions in Norway, that have regions and a 
preparedness system much closer located. The Municipality of Hammerfest is the main 
supporter related to the activities in the Barents Sea. Kirkenes also plays an important role and 
seeks to strengthening its role as an important petroleum base within the Barents Sea region 
(Jacobsen, 2012). In the future many locations along the coast will most likely become supply 
bases (Henningsgård, 2013).  
The long distances between shore and the installations create longer respond time for 
emergency resources such as personnel, equipment, vessels and helicopters to reach a crisis 
situation offshore. These challenges leads to that the operating oil companies in the area needs 
to find new solutions to safeguard their preparedness system. The main challenges are related 
to helicopter capacity and emergency equipment (Larsen, PSA, 2014). 
There are few available airports with proper capacity in the Barents Sea. These airports are 
important contributors to the flow of resources in the petroleum industry. The main resources 
available in the Barents Sea related to preparedness are helicopters, coast guard vessels and 
vessels operated by Norwegian Sea rescue. The Norwegian navy’s coast guard vessels and 
Royal Norwegian Air Force may also assist helicopters and a search and rescue helicopter 
(AWSAR) may be sent from Hammerfest. The public rescue helicopter 330 Squadron has an 
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operation limit of 340 kilometres from shore, but some of the activity in the area is more then 
450 kilometres from shore. There are no filling stations for helicopter in the Barents Sea, 
which is needed if the helicopters are going to operate over their limit, which will be the case 
in the northern parts of the Barents Sea (PTIL, 2014a). With few helicopter resources in the 
Barents Sea this makes the oil and gas companies more dependent on vessels. There are also a 
shortage of appropriately equipped vessels that may be called out for assistance during a 
terror attack (Ims, 2013). In addition helicopter can rescue people in almost any weather 
condition but the standby vessels will struggle more to meet this challenges (Ims, 2013). On 
the other hand there are vessels related to fisheries, naval activity, maritime tanker and bulk 
transport, cruise ships etc. located in the Barents Sea (Jacobsen, 2012). 
There will be struggles to rescue, transport and provide medical treatment to 80-140 people 
working on an offshore installation in the Barents Sea (Jacobsen, 2012). Medical evacuation 
is difficult in the area due to the long distance from shore. It is required that the medical team 
in the petroleum industry gets the patient to a onshore hospital within three hours (PTIL, 
2014a). There are hospitals in Hammerfest and Kirkenes and The University Hospital of 
Tromsø is also available, but is located 200km from Hammerfest (Ims, 2013). The challenges 
related to medical assistance could be solved with a even more robust medical team located 
on the oil platform, but also with more medical capacity onshore is needed (PTIL, 2014a).  
Those who know the region are familiar with the challenges related to the lack of capacity and 
available resources. It is larger distances between the operators in the Barents Sea are, due to 
the lack of activity. The activities in the area are expected to increase in the years to come 
(Jacobsen, 2012).  
“Collaboration with other companies, partners, external suppliers and the authority is 
important for the oil companies facing terror threat in the Barents Sea. A terror attack 
is a turbulent and difficult situation to handle, especially in the Barents Sea, and 
requires collaboration of resources between all the actors if a situation occurs” 
(Participant 1&2, Statoil, 2014).   
The long distances between the installations and lack of resources compared to the rest of 
NCS makes the petroleum companies more dependent on resource allocation and information 
sharing. Many companies are now teaming up, but again there are challenges when there are 
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limited numbers of resources, if several crises or accidents take place at the same time (Skog, 
Acona, 2014).   
Oil and gas companies operating in the Barents Sea have their 2nd line preparedness team 
located at their main offices in Norway. ENI Norge AS has worked out a plan on how they 
are going to build a supportive 2nd preparedness team in Hammerfest. There are mainly 3 
preparedness roles that are going to be located here: next of kin role, environmental liaison 
role and role with local knowledge. In addition there is also a regional guard. These 
supportive roles are not specifically aimed for the Barents Sea, but work more as a standard 
procedure when entering new areas regardless if it is in Kristiansund or Hammerfest. 
Organizational preparedness in general is not changed moving further north on the NCS 
(Waldeland, Eni Norge, 2014). Statoil operates in the same way. They have established a 
preparedness team in Harstad that functions as a support line to their 2nd line preparedness 
team in Bergen. It is required that the 2nd line support team has extensive local knowledge 
about the Barents Sea and its environment (Stabell, Statoil, 2014). 
“There are fewer preparedness team members located in the northern part of Norway. 
This creates communication and collaboration challenges, and if a terrorist attack 
takes place on an offshore oil installation in the Barents Sea there would be less 
support and help from supply vessels and personnel working on other installations 
compared to a crisis further south on the NCS” (Solhaug, Police, 2014). 
The preparedness system located in Stavanger and Bergen are based on the infrastructure, 
resources and installations in the North Sea and Norwegian Sea. In these waters installations 
are closely located, with plenty of resources nearby such as support vessels, supply vessels, 
transport network and helicopters. The North Sea is a small geographic area compared to the 
Barents Sea, in addition the activity level is huge compared to the Barents Sea. Comparing the 
knowledge about the North Sea shows that the companies have little preparedness experience 
from the Barents Sea (Andersen, 2014). The helicopter resources in the Barents Sea are lower 
then in the south mainly due to the geographical differences (Rødal, 2012). 
There is a need for evaluation of the preparedness resources that are present in Barents Sea 
related to the increased activity and responsibility. This requires a strong collaboration and 
interaction between operators, authorities and local participants (Borch, 2013).   
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4.4 Terrorism: a sharp, fragmented and unclear threat situation 
Terrorism is defined as intentional act damaging or destroying technical, organizational, or 
social systems and human lives. Examples of intentional acts are bombing, kidnapping, cyber 
attacks, terrorist attacks and manipulation (Mitroff, 2005). “We define intentional acts as 
when someone on purpose try to or succeed to harm personnel, damage our assets and/or our 
organization” (Nielsen, ENI Norge, 2014).    
“Terror attacks can really happen, they have happened to Statoil and it is highly 
relevant for our organization” (Stabell, Statoil, 2014). 
Terrorism often has international ramifications, but the terror attack on Utøya the 22 of July 
2011 shows that terror can hit Norway, by a Norwegian, based on Norwegian relations. The 
terror threat situation in Norway is affected by development trends both in Norway and 
globally (Justis og beredskapsdepartementet, 2013 (4)). Norway has been spared for more 
incidents and attacks that other countries. These countries have easier built a culture and a 
greater understanding of the potential threat facing their nation (Participant 1&2, Statoil, 
2014).   
“The terror threat against Norway is considered to have aggravated” (PST, 2014 p.2) 
The development trend illustrates a sharp, fragmented and unclear threat situation. Today 
extremist Islamic ideology is considered the highest terror threat against Norway. Other 
threatening ideologists in Norway are hostility to Islam, Right wing and Left wing extremists. 
This is mainly due to the increased political extremism and violent activities in Europe. There 
are little that indicates that these ambitions will create terror attacks across national borders, 
and this threat has still not jet affected Norway (Norwegian Directorate for Civil Protection, 
2013). 
4.4.1 The Norwegian terror threat picture  
Norway’s prosperity and welfare are dependent on export from the oil and gas industry. Oil 
and gas installations in Norway are particular important for the country to develop a steady 
economic growth. This makes the oil installations both onshore and offshore a potential 
terrorist target, due to the strategic value of the industry for Norway and countries that relies 
on their import (Ulriksen, 2013). 
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The offshore oil and gas industry has developed rapidly in the recent years due to increased 
energy demand and energy security. This has made oil and gas installations offshore more 
vulnerable to terrorism attacks due to their economical importance. The petroleum companies 
are more aware of the threat in the society, where they have increased their efforts on 
strengthening their preparedness system (Kashubsky, 2013).  
“We have always had procedures on how to deal with terror situations offshore in 
Statoil, but the focus has changes extremely in the last few years due to events like 22 
July and In Amenas. In Amenas has been extremely helpful for us, where we got 
criticism on security areas that we were not aware of before. After the In Amenas 
attack we have done many improvements within our management system, internal 
requirements and security analysis” (Brusdal, Statoil, 2014). 
Statoil has increased their security workforce acquiring security personnel working primarily 
within each business area. Increased security awareness within the organization is essential. 
The employee’s attitude towards security risk should be that “all employees have a 
responsibility to secure safety”. The organization needs to become more united creating 
common organizational systems and frameworks (Midttun, 2013).  
The Norwegian police security service (PST) analysis the annual threat picture and expected 
developments, where they focus on factors that may affect Norway’s security. The most 
important area they assessed for 2014 is to prevent people with close connection to Norway to 
be involved in terrorism attacks. Due to rapid changes in the society there are uncertainties 
related to the development trends. To reduce this uncertainty PST has chosen to only focus on 
the general trends in the threat picture and not single events that can affect the picture on 
some areas (PST, 2014).  
The main purpose of the PST annual threat assessment is to increase the awareness and 
understanding of development trends related to the national terror threat picture. The 
assessment is mainly aimed at national decisions makers that are responsible of the policies or 
facilities related to PST’s responsibility area. The main actors are political leaders, 
departments related to PST’s responsibility area, central management bodies within the 
Norwegian Police and military, and key players in the Norwegian business sector (PST, 
2013). PST also provides consulting within security quality within critical social functions 
and infrastructure, both for the public and private sector. E.g. PST cooperates with the oil and 
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energy sector. Different businesses and sectors need different type of assistant, where they all 
have specific challenges and conditions that affect the security. PST assess social 
consequences of single events related to each sector, taking into consideration both 
Norwegian International threats (PST, 2013). 
Petroleum companies are dependent on PST’s threat assessment, but they also have 
established own systems in order to gather information about the terror threat picture 
(Participant 1&2, Statoil, 2014).  
“We have close dialogue with PST and their threat assessments where we will be 
notified if there are any increase of terror threats against oil and gas installations” 
(Brusdal, Statoil, 2014).  
In addition oil companies use earlier experiences and accidents to evaluate what development 
and trends that are influencing the threat picture against their oil and gas installations: 
“PST’s threat assessment is only one source of information. We also buy information 
from other external source. Our threat assessment is therefore based on information 
from the authorities, external sources and own information. PST is still the primary 
source and we have close cooperation” (Participant 1&2, Statoil, 2014).   
There are disagreements on the security of oil and gas installations in Norway related to how 
strong the security should be and how often it should be updated. The Norwegian Ministry of 
Petroleum and energy (OED) concludes that there is no need for a better security protection of 
oil and gas installations in Norway. Further OED states that that nothing points in the 
direction where petroleum installations are sensitive terror targets (Helgesen, 2013). The PST, 
the national security authority (NSM) and The Norwegian Intelligence Service (NIS) strongly 
disagree. Siri Meling from the Norwegian Conservative Party states in an interview with the 
newspaper Aftenblandet in 2013 that, “I think this is a surprising conclusion, and it seems 
naive to think that petroleum installations are not highly vulnerable terror targets”. Oil as a 
product has a strong symbolic effect, and those working on the platforms are highly 
vulnerable to terror threats. In the threat evaluation from 2013 NSM, PST and NIS states that 
the oil and gas sector is an attractive terror target where terrorists seek goals that represents 
symbolic value (Lewis, 2013b). 
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Although there are disagreements on the threat vulnerability of oil and gas installations, the 
PST has presented some trends and developments in the society that affects the terror threat 
level in Norway. This is highly dependent on the terrorist’s capacity and intention (PST, 
2014). 
The world experiences economical turbulence with an on going economic crisis affecting a 
number of European countries, creating ripple effects in several areas. Increased 
unemployment and poverty in countries can lead to increased feeling of hopelessness and 
where people are more open to propaganda from different political directions. The recruitment 
to extreme environments has increased in several European countries and it can increase the 
motivation and capacity to commit terrorist attacks. So far we have not seen these effects of 
the economic crisis in Norway (Justis og beredskapsdepartementet, 2013 (1)). 
In areas such as Afghanistan, Pakistan, Yemen and the Sahelt belt, have weak authority 
control and extreme groups quickly are established (Justis og beredskapsdepartementet, 2013 
(1)). 
Travel activities have become more organized and it has become easier for terrorists to travel 
abroad to receive ideological training, battle experience and expand their network (Justis og 
beredskapsdepartementet, 2013 (1)). 
The rapid technological development and globalization have made the challenges related to 
terrorism more complex. Due to Internet and digital networks it has become easier to support 
extreme Islam groups and to perform activities in better and more efficient ways. The 
globalization has made Norway more visible internationally through new communication 
networks. Today political debates, standpoints and initiates that are promoted one place in the 
world can easily spread to other parts of the world (Norwegian Directorate for Civil 
Protection, 2013). 
Radicalization is the process in which a person increasingly accepts the use of violence to 
achieve its political goals. Radicalization can happen with all types of beliefs, political 
agendas and ideologies. In Norway there has been an increasing trend of young Norwegian 
citizens supporting extreme and violent ideologies. Many of these have a polarized worldview 
and are often easily affected. Other seek belonging within extreme environments where they 
feel accepted (Justis og beredskapsdepartementet, 2013 (1)). 
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“It is difficult to say how the terror picture will develop in the future since it depends 
on a combination of political situations and developments in the society. The less 
integrated people are in the society the more increased are the likelihood of extreme 
events. In addition the development against young people with mental disorders 
affects the threat picture” (Nielsen, ENI Norge, 2014).   
“The PST rapport states that the biggest threat is Islamic terrorists coming back from 
Syria after practicing on terror and war attacks” (Jerre, DNV-GL, 2014). 
It is naive to believe that terror attacks will not happen in Norway, but it is difficult to protect 
us against these attacks. Often only one person with intentions and capacity is needed to 
perform a terror attack. It is much easier to implement good security procedures when the 
threat level is high, rather than when you don’t see any threats at all” (Participant 1&2, 
Statoil, 2014).   
4.4.2 Terror threats against oil and gas installations 
Oil and gas platform in the Barents Sea is facing a variety of threats related to intentional 
attacks. Terror threats against petroleum installations can be everything from bomb threats, 
taking hostages, activism, sabotage, theft of valuable or sensitive information as industrial 
espionage or cyber attack or breaking into the control room where the organization loose 
control of IT systems (Jerre, DNV-GL, 2014) (Nielsen, ENI Norge, 2014). If a terrorist gets 
access and control of the IT system controlling oil and gas installations, the terrorists can do 
great harm  (Nielsen, ENI Norge, 2014). Terror attacks can take form in endlessly ways, from 
small to large attacks, to coordinated and non-coordinated attacks (Brusdal, Statoil, 2014). 
Terrorists tend to coordinate multiple raids of attacks, where the diversionary attack is 
designed to divert the attention of the larger attack. The preparedness management will then 
use longer time to respond and the terrorists will get the chance to do even more harm (Wu, 
2009). “Terrorist attacks can easily take place at several installations at once, creating even 
more uncertainty” (Nielsen, ENI Norge, 2014).   
There is a distinguish between external and internal threats: 
Internal threats are threats from within the organization, such as employees or other profiles 
taking part in the daily processes. These people have access to resources, information, 
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systems and procedures. Typically these people will be authorized individuals that have easy 
access to sensitive information and highly knowledge about the organization (Cutler, 2013).  
“Internal threats could be a terrorist infiltrated in our organization. It is more likely 
that terrorist tries to become a part of the organization then approaching from the 
outside at offshore installations located in a harsh environment. I will be much more 
afraid of a terrorist internally in our company, since this is a person with technical 
competence and has the ability to do major damages within a limited amount of time 
without weapons or equipment” (Nielsen, ENI Norge, 2014).   
“Terrorists may use several years building up their competence. The terrorist can be 
someone who has worked in our company for 10 years, with high knowledge and 
experience within the company. Then you will have highly competent people that can 
do great harm to the organization” (Brusdal, Statoil, 2014). 
External threats will be people that are not part of the organization or belong to any group 
that has any direct relation with the organization, but still has a goal of targeting the 
organization (Cutler, 2013).  
“External threats are typically terrorists that attacks the platform from the outside 
and takes partially or fully control of the platform. External threats can also be people 
with political or religious beliefs and in some cases with a mental disorder which I 
would say is highly correlated” (Nielsen, ENI Norge, 2014).  
Greenpeace has several times through peaceful demonstrations shown how easy it is to enter 
oil and gas installations. Statoil has experienced actions from Greenpeace dressing up as polar 
bears and boarding one of their rigs. The OIM took them on board, drank coffee with them 
and explained them about their activities and thereafter brought them to shore. Statoil do not 
have an aggressive approach for removing activists, but rather remove them in a peaceful way 
(Brusdal, Statoil, 2014). ENI Norge has also had experience with Greenpeace trying to do a 
campaign on Esperance where they did some test drilling. They solved the situation by 
disconnecting, move the rig and hide close to Snøhvit for a day. This was to avoid the 
publicity and attention from the media. ENI has a clear policy related to non-governmental 
organisations such as Bellona and Greenpeace. They will not act aggressive and rather invite 
the activists on board and document the situation with surveillance cameras. They have 
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people in their organisation that are trained to handle such situations (Nielsen, ENI Norge, 
2014).   
Environmental activists do not have intentions of harming people. Often they only seek 
publicity, while a terrorists wish to create fear through disturbing ways. I am 
personally much more afraid of a terrorist attack then a Greenpeace action” 
(Waldeland, Eni Norge, 2014). 
Environmental activist has also boarded the Russian Barents Sea. Greenpeace activists and 
two journalists sailed on the organizations icebreaker, Arctic Sunrise, on the 28th of 
September 2013, boarding Russia’s Prorazlomnoye oilrig in the Pechora Sea. They were 
arrested, but shortly after they were released in December. After the first exports of oil, 
President Vladimir Putin signed into law on act “the establishment of departmental security 
to ensure the safety of the fuel and energy complex”. This law allows corporations to establish 
their own private security forces to defend their infrastructure. Putin has also discussed with 
the Russian Security Council, on how to strengthen Russia in the Arctic. He urges the 
importance of protecting oil and gas facilities, loading terminals and pipelines from terrorists 
and other potential threats. One of the Greenpeace activists sees this only as the beginning. 
Oil companies are moving further north; climate changes are taking place and new challenges 
arise. Putin’s increased security forces on oil and gas installations in the Arctic create a whole 
new perspective on the Arctic energy race (Bennett, 2014). 
4.4.3 Risk Assessment  
“Black Swan” is a concept used to describe unpredictable accidents with major consequences. 
Risk-analyses are techniques used to identify and define preventive measure to prevent 
accidents from happening. Traditional risk-analyses are not able to capture unpredictable 
events, such as terror attacks, due to high complexity and uncertainty. Organizations facing 
the threat of terror need to build a complex security system with the right competence, strong 
management and interplay between the people and systems (Dahle, 2013).  
Assessments of different terror scenarios are a key element to maintain a high security level 
offshore (Parfomak, 2007). On the 22nd of July at Utøya no one could estimate the probability 
of the attack and how it would happen. Security assessments should be based on the 
consequences of an attack and how well the prevention barriers function, rather than the 
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probability of an attack taking place. The security risk assessment should rather assess the 
vulnerability assuming the attack will take place and then assess how prepared the 
organization is to meet the attacks (Jerre, DNV-GL, 2014). 
 “A terrorist attack can not be calculated in the same way as other potential threats 
because of its dynamic situation. It is difficult to say if the probability of a terror 
attack on an oil platform is low or high. It is a misjudgement to say that the 
probability is low, just as there is a misjudgement to say that the probability is high. 
Oil companies are capable of making risk-analysis estimating if the risk of a terror 
attack is high or low, but then something happens that changes the situation 
completely” (Nielsen, ENI Norge, 2014).   
There are several scenarios and ways terrorists can attack. Through a risk assessment it is 
possible for the oil and gas organizations to evaluate the probability of a barrier failure and 
the impact or effect of an attack. The threat level of the terrorist is based on its intention and 
capacity to perform the attack. Based on this statement some scenarios have a higher risk than 
others. Those scenarios with a high risk will be marked with red in the risk matrix bellow, 
assuming that these scenarios have a higher risk than other scenarios marked with yellow 
(medium risk) and green (low risk) (Jerre, DNV-GL, 2014). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
Figure 14 - Risk matrix: the probability and consequences of different terror threats 
(Jerre, DNV-GL, 2014) 
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Oil and gas organizations also measure the terror risk related to what barriers that are in place 
and how well they protect against potential terror threats. When the barrier evaluation is done, 
the organization needs to make a security plan for each oil and gas installation describing 
specifically what terror threats each installation is facing and the security controls that are in 
place (Jerre, DNV-GL, 2014). 
Barriers are set up by the oil companies to prevent incidents such as terror attacks. Prevention 
barriers can be anything from technical barriers, procedures, training, plans, and inspections 
and employees awareness. Barriers are also set increasing and improving the terror awareness 
among the employees and personnel. Terror awareness works on early warning signals to 
prevent the event from escalating. Petroleum companies have four types of barriers in place 
prevent the attack from initiating, detect the attack early enough, delay the attackers in their 
progress and how to respond to the attack (Jerre, DNV-GL, 2014). 
4.4.4 Security culture  
Organizations have problems understanding how intentional acts can take place and where 
many sees these threats as “this will not happen to us” (Mitroff, 2005). 
“The threat of terrorism in Norway are relatively low compared to other countries, 
but this does not mean it cannot happen. The consequences if it happens are often 
huge especially in the petroleum industry. We need to mitigate the risks of terrorism 
through strengthening our organization culture on security” (Participant 1&2, Statoil, 
2014).   
Statoil has lifted its security management and workforce after the In Amenas terror attack. 
This should not be on the expense of the work within health, safety and environment (HSE). 
Increased security awareness within the organization is essential. The organization needs to 
become more united through common organizational systems and frameworks, strong 
management systems, clear definitions of requirement, the right competence and capacity 
within security (Midttun, 2013).  
“We work mainly to build a security culture where all of our employees will report 
back to the office if something suspicious emerge. 20,000 employees working for the 
same cause, having eyes and ears open, reporting back to the office is defines as really 
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good security preparedness. This is not done over nigh and something we further have 
to work on” (Participant 1&2, Statoil, 2014).   
Norway is a naive nation and always thinks the best about others compared to the U.S where 
you are a criminal until the opposite is proven (Stabell, Statoil, 2014). Statoil admit that they 
have been perhaps a little bit naive and see improvements area within security. Today several 
measures and actions are done in the security field, but Statoil wants to do more (Participant 
1&2, Statoil, 2014).   
 “Background checks are done on everyone hired“(Stabell, Statoil, 2014). 
More focus has been given to background checks of new personnel, suppliers and other 
collaboration partners. Oil companies operate in an international industry and it is important 
to be aware of who you communicate with internal and external. Access to offices, buildings 
and installations in general has been strengthening. Changes have been done related to general 
routines such as: memory sticks by external actors are not allowed to be connected to the 
organizations computer system, stricter identification systems before allowing access, stricter 
follow up of visitors, and more awareness in general of information sharing specially in 
public places. All of these changes are small steps towards a better security organization 
culture (Stabell, Statoil, 2014). 
UK is one of the largest producers of offshore oil and gas in the world, and the government 
has made several changes in their security policy after accidents such as the Piper Alpha 
explosions that killed 167 people (Australian Government, 2012). In England, Essington, 
have a strong physical security around their platforms and installations, with possibility of 
being armed. Norway are not the same level of physical security. The security in Norway 
rather focuses on seeing the signals and the prevention phase before the attack occurs. If there 
are terrorist who really want to attack they will most likely succeed (Jerre, DNV-GL, 2014) 
One of the biggest challenges in Norway is that we have been spared for a lot of incidents and 
attacks compared to other countries, which has made them more able to build a culture and an 
understanding of different measures. If you compare security in the oil and gas sector in UK 
and Norway they are completely different. They have experiences actual events, which has 
made them realise how necessary it is to focus on protection. Norway is not at the same level 
related to understanding the importance of security (Participant 1&2, Statoil, 2014).   
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Summary 
In this chapter we have presented our empirical findings. The chapter is divided in four parts 
presenting the oil companies preparedness system, the national preparedness system, the 
Barents Sea and terrorism. The empirical findings are a combination of secondary and 
primary data. The primary data presented is from interviews with participants from the 
authority and the industry. The secondary data is primary from books, article and journals. 
The empirical data will be analyses further linked up to the theoretical framework in analysis 
chapter. The main finding in this chapter is summed up here in four sections.  
The oil companies preparedness system is divided into three teams, that all has to cooperate 
during a crisis situation. The 1st line preparedness team is present at the accident place; the 2nd 
line preparedness is a support for the 1st line and the 3rd line assure the quality of the 2nd line 
assistance. Most of the larger oil companies have an in house preparedness organization, but 
they still outsource some parts of the preparedness team to external actors. The oil companies 
have both internal exercises with the different preparedness lines and external exercises where 
they invite other actors to participate such as the police, military and other preparedness 
actors.   
 
The Norwegian preparedness system is an integrated system with several actors, divided into 
four managerial levels. The Norwegian Government is responsible for handling a crisis 
situation such as terrorist attack, each Ministry has their own preparedness plan and training 
to handle crisis situations within their area of responsibility, the National Police Directorate, 
is the superior authority for the police districts and special agencies and the police are 
responsible of preventing and combating terrorism. Several other actors also have 
preparedness responsibilities such as PSA, the military, PST and the ministry of defence.  
  
The Barents Sea is a complex and turbulent environment where it is required that the response 
and preparedness in the Barents Sea should be at least as good as the rest of the NCS. The 
main challenges related to security preparedness are the lack of infrastructure, facilities and 
resources. Large distances and few vessels and helicopters also characterize the Barents Sea 
area. Obligatory and specific cooperation frameworks need to be built between the operators 
and the governmental authorities to conduct safe and secure operations, working for common 
solutions and systems to meet the Barents challenges. The preparedness team handling crisis 
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situations in the Barents Sea should be both flexible and innovative, and at the same time 
have clear responsibilities, roles and tasks.  
 
Terrorism is a sharp, fragmented and unclear threat situation. Oil and gas installations 
offshore are more vulnerable to terrorism attacks due to their economical importance. It is 
naive to believe that terror attacks will not happen in Norway, but it is difficult to protect 
against these attacks. Oil and gas platform in the Barents Sea is facing a variety of threats 
related to intentional attacks. Terror attacks can take form in endlessly ways, from small to 
large attacks, and from coordinated to non-coordinated attacks. There are several scenarios 
and ways terrorists can attack. Through a risk assessment it is possible for the oil and gas 
organizations to evaluate the probability of a barrier failure and the impact or effect of an 
attack. The threat level of the terrorist is based on its intention and capacity to perform the 
attack. There is a need for a change in today’s security culture for the companies to be able to 
face the new terror threats.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Master	  thesis	  –	  Master	  of	  Sciences	  in	  Energy	  Management	  	  Bodø,	  2014	  
 
Bodø Graduate School of Business  
 
78 
5.0 Data Analysis  
This chapter focuses on the data analysis from the primary and secondary data. All the 
secondary and primary data are presented in the empirical data chapter. The theory and the 
empirical findings lay the foundation when analysing how the managerial roles within the oil 
companies preparedness system needs be strengthen when moving into a more complex and 
turbulent environment facing the threat of terror attacks on offshore installations.  
The research question in this study is: 
“How to strengthen the managerial roles within the 2nd preparedness team against 
terror threats in the Barents Sea?” 
In order to answer this problem statement, the following sub-questions has been analysed and 
answered:  
1. How can the managerial roles within the 2nd preparedness team be strengthened to 
prepare for terror attacks in the Barents Sea?  
2. What measures should the national preparedness system implement to strengthen the 
2nd line preparedness teams ability to prepare for terror threats in the Barents Sea? 
3. What are the main preparedness challenges in the Barents Sea that needs to be solved 
for the 2nd line preparedness team to handle terror threats?   
4. What measures should the oil companies and their 2nd line preparedness team 
implement to prepare for terror threats in the Barents Sea? 
These questions are based on the data collected throughout the research project, both primary 
and secondary, and the analysis findings have been derived from these questions. 
Additionally, these questions helped identify the theories being used in the study  
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5.1 Oil companies preparedness system and the preparedness team 
The oil companies are responsible for establishing an effective preparedness system to handle 
every hazards and accidents that might occur, regulated by the Petroleum Act. The oil 
companies structure their preparedness system in different ways, but all of them have a basic 
structure of a 1st line, 2nd line and 3rd line preparedness team.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 15 - The relationship between 1st, 2nd and 3rd line preparedness team 
The size of a team depends on the complexity and extent of the organization it operates 
within. If the team becomes too large it can contribute to problems with information sharing 
and coordination (Aarset, 2014a). The oil companies preparedness system consists of three 
preparedness teams that are all linked to several other participants also referred to as support 
lines. The whole system is complex with many actors involved. During a terrorist attack 
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additional actors will be involved such as the police, the military force and other forces 
trained to combat terrorism.  
The larger oil companies in Norway have in-house preparedness teams, but sometimes they 
choose to outsource parts of their 2nd line preparedness team to external preparedness actors 
such as Acona. There are both advantages and disadvantages with outsourcing roles and 
responsibilities in the preparedness team. The preparedness team consists of several roles with 
large responsibilities making it difficult to handle all the preparedness processes themselves. 
One way of releasing some of the responsibility can be done through outsourcing, where the 
external actor takes over some of the preparedness areas. Even though this releases some of 
the responsibility it creates more roles involved in the preparedness process. Through 
outsourcing some of the roles and responsibilities there are more actors depending on 
information to understand the situation and to be able to perform their task. By outsourcing 
some roles the 2nd preparedness team will be located in two locations, where a new role takes 
form responsible of sharing information and communicating across the two 2nd line teams. 
Having the 2nd preparedness team gathered at one place in the same room will create less 
confusion and misunderstandings. There are some roles and responsibilities that are easier to 
outsource than others. It is easier to outsource responsibility areas that do not influence 
directly the crisis situation offshore. One responsibility area several oil companies choose to 
outsource is the next of kin, which involves the contacting, and informing relatives of 
personnel involved in the crisis situation offshore. As long as the oil companies are able to 
give information and communicate in an efficient way, outsourcing will help the preparedness 
team to focus on those roles necessary to handle the crisis situation offshore. This is reflected 
through Mintzberg’s (1989) managerial role theory stating that it is difficult for a manager to 
simultaneously give equal attention to all roles.  
By outsourcing some of the responsibility areas the managers are able to concentrate and give 
more attention to the remaining roles. For the information sharing and collaboration process 
between the oil company and the outsourcing actor to be successful, the two should practice 
and train together on crisis situations. Through training they will be prepared to handle crisis 
situations together as a team, rather than two individual preparedness teams. It is important to 
not underestimate the importance of training, where earlier events show the importance of 
practice increasing the awareness of roles and responsibility during a crisis situation. The 
managerial role theory by Mintzberg’s (1989) states that several actors cannot share the same 
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role and responsibility if they are not able to act as one unit. To be able to act as one unit 
during a crisis situation all actors need to conduct exercises together. These exercises are 
based on DSHA scenarios, where the threat of terror represents one of them. 
There are different ways for the preparedness team to perform exercises and training on terror 
threat situations. The oil companies are good at performing exercises internally within the 
preparedness organization, including all three preparedness teams. They also perform 
exercises individually for each preparedness team, on the platform for the 1st line, in the 
preparedness room 2nd line, and strategically on the 3rd line. Moving into more complex 
environments with lack of resources and infrastructure the importance of exercises including 
all participants during a crisis situation becomes highly vital. The main preparedness actors 
during a terror situation offshore would be the police, the military, standby installations, the 
cost guard and other external actors. The preparedness teams have more exercises within 
tabletop and functional exercises, while there should be an increased focus on full-scale 
exercises including more preparedness actors. A full-scale exercise are close to a real crisis 
situation where the location, resources and personnel is the same during the exercises as in a 
real situation (Bråten, 2013). By conducting more full-scale exercises the preparedness team 
are able to test several parts of their preparedness plan, and more players are being tested 
simultaneously. There are lack of requirements from the government stating that the oil 
companies needs to conduct full-scale exercises on a high level to handle complex 
environment facing unpredictable crisis situations. Oil companies should increase the amount 
of full-scale exercises performed to test how their preparedness system works in all types of 
potential crisis environments These exercises are designed to challenge the entire 
preparedness system, including all participants, in a stressful and dynamic crisis situation.  
Practise and training related to terror attacks are prioritized on the same level as other DSHA 
such as fire, man over board, helicopter accident, collusion danger, injury or illness of 
personnel. During a terror threat situation several more resources and participants are needed 
to handle the situation, requiring a much more comprehensive and complex preparedness 
system. The terror attack on an oil platform can take place in different ways requiring that the 
preparedness needs to prepare for different terror attacks scenarios (Johansen, 1994). Due to 
the complexity of a terrorist attack, compared to other DSHA, we suggest that threat 
situations like these are given more practice in addition to the once already performed.  
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Oil companies operating on the NCS should learn from those countries that have high 
experience from terror attacks. The petroleum companies should also learn from each other 
related to own terrorism experience. In this case Statoil is a major operator on the NCS who 
has experienced a terror attack In Amenas. This attack has affected their organization and 
strengthened their security so much that other petroleum companies have take benefit and 
learnt from their experience. Today there are collaboration between the oil companies where 
they share experiences and knowledge related to security through networking. To strengthen 
this collaboration and knowledge sharing process oil companies should conduct more 
common exercises and training within terrorism. Terrorist attacks require response from 
several actors to solve the situation. We see a lack of exercises related to terror, between the 
oil companies, which we believe is necessary to be able to assist each other during a crisis 
situation. The oil companies can benefit from common exercises both in terms of learning but 
also related to resource sharing. Resource collaboration during a crisis situation is necessary 
and could be anything from personnel, helicopter services, equipment and communication 
lines. The allocation of resources between the oil companies depends on the situation, what 
resources that are available and needed. To utilize these resources in the best way are highly 
dependent on the communication and information sharing between the oil companies (Njå, 
1998). Today we see no evidence that these types of exercises do occur, and we believe this 
should be done at least once a year. 
Summary  
The preparedness system consists of three preparedness teams, and their interaction with 
dependent participants during crisis situations. It is a highly complex system where we 
recommend that the roles, such as media handling and next of kin that are not directly 
impacting the offshore crisis, should be outsourced to external preparedness actors. The roles 
in the preparedness team can then focus more on how to handle the offshore situation, whit 
less responsibility areas to relate to.  
The oil companies perform both exercises individually for each team and common exercises 
for the whole system. Handling threat situations involving a high level of resources and 
participant requires a lot more training with other preparedness actors and oil companies than 
performed today. Oil companies should increase the amount of full-scale exercises to test 
entire preparedness system, including all participants, in a stressful and dynamic crisis 
situation.  
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The terror attack on an oil platform can take place in different ways requiring that the 
preparedness needs to prepare for different terror attacks scenarios The oil companies should 
focus more on practice and training due to terrorism, compared to other DSHA, due to its 
complexity.  
The oil companies should strengthen their cooperation and knowledge sharing related to 
terrorism. To strengthen this collaboration and knowledge sharing process oil companies 
should conduct more common exercises and training within terrorism. To be able to share 
resources and assist each other during an attack on a platform, it is vital that they need to 
communicate more and share information.  
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5.2 The national preparedness system and the preparedness team 
The Norwegian preparedness system is established to assist oil companies during crisis 
situations, involving several institutions and actors. These participants and the oil company 
need to coordinate the information and the resources to manage a crisis situation. They are 
given specific roles and responsibility between these participants. The Norwegian 
preparedness system is divided into four levels: political, strategic, operative and tactical. The 
Norwegian government represent the political level, the ministries represent the strategic 
level, while the police directorate represent the operative level, and the police districts 
represent the tactical level.  
The performance-based model gives a clear split of responsibilities, where the authority is 
responsible for setting goals and acceptance criteria’s. The oil companies are responsible to 
make sure that the performance goals are met. A Performance-based model is usually used by 
the authorities because they want to minimize their own risk and liability (Tørstad, 2010 ). 
The oil companies are responsible of securing the oil installations and if a crisis situation 
occurs all the responsibility and risk will lie on their shoulders. We have seen that oil 
companies tend to set stricter requirements related to security than the authorities. One reason 
for this might be that the oil companies have experience within terror and its potential threats, 
where they see a higher risk threat picture than the authorities. If the oil companies are not 
prepared for terror attacks they stand responsible for the losses related to human lives, 
economical losses, facilities damages, damage to the environment and reputation. To 
minimize these risks the petroleum companies have taken actions to set stricter requirements. 
The oil companies and their preparedness team need to collaborate with the authorities to set 
more realistic and common requirements in relation to combat terrorism.  
The Norwegian practice related to security is still on the preventing phase, with an aim to 
build a strong system to prevent terrorist attack from occurring. Other countries that have 
experiences in terrorist attacks, several times, have worked on building a strong physical 
security of their installations. These countries are on a totally different level related to security 
than oil companies operating on the NCS. The closest the Norwegian oil companies get to 
physical security is the requirement of the 500 meters safety zones surrounding the 
installations. In Scotland the police protects the most important oil installations with armed 
people around the oil installations. The onshore plants are protected with fences and guards 
that are trained to deal with terror attacks. As the security onshore has been tighten, since the 
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attack InAmneas and the 22nd of July offshore targets are likely to be more vulnerable. To 
increase awareness and the threat related to terrorism, the Norwegian preparedness system 
should increase the physical security of oil installations on the NCS. Security solutions such 
as sensors and access control system will add extra layers to attack an offshore installation. 
Prevention barriers can be anything from technical barriers, procedures, training, plans, and 
inspections and employees awareness (Jerre, DNV-GL, 2014). Physical security can be done 
in a number of ways by either protecting the installation with a boom or to have ladders that 
can be pulled up to prevent the attackers to board the offshore installation. The helicopter 
deck can be protected in different ways, by ensuring that only some types of helicopters are 
capable to land on the deck. There are also measures that can be done related to electronic 
security of a platform to detect early warning signs from shore. A strong physical security will 
remind people of the threats facing the installations and the organization. It will also give 
signals to potential intruders that the oil companies and their national force are prepared and 
aware of the threats facing their installations. The Norwegian preparedness system needs to 
learn from other countries and their preparedness system related to their physical protection 
and security culture.  
 
The preparedness team are dependent on national resources to handle a terror threat situation. 
The constitution Article 99 in Norway states “the military forces shall not be used against 
civilians, where a terrorist attack is an exception”. For the national resources to be used 
during a crisis situation, the ministry needs to give approval of this. This is a time consuming 
process where the police chief sends “a request for assistance” to the Ministry of Justice 
through the Police Directorate. During a potential terrorist attack military assistance is highly 
needed, immediately. Today this process takes too much time and lives can be lost due to how 
the system is designed. The time the ministries take to answer the request of assistants is one 
of the biggest weaknesses in today’s national preparedness system. In the interview with the 
Police they stated that during last years Gemini exercises the response time for assistance was 
33 hours, by that time the terrorists could do extreme damage both to people, installation and 
environment. The police are now working on simplifying this process. One of the efforts the 
police have implemented is that they notify the special force immediately, so they can use the 
time to prepare the necessary resources.  
In areas lacking infrastructure there is higher demand of sharing resources and cooperating 
(Njå, 1998). The current legal framework that regulates the oil companies lacks strict 
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regulations and framework on how to cooperate and share resources. Even though the new 
“principle of cooperation” ensures better organization of social security and preparedness 
efforts, the principle doesn’t emphasise in which areas there is a need for stronger cooperation 
and how the distribution of resources should take place.   
Theory states that teams that are highly interactive will have a better precondition of 
developing shared mental models than teams that are not (Brun, 2003). The Norwegian Police 
have annual exercises with the military, police and the oil companies. The annual exercises 
switch between the four police districts with shelf responsibility, every year. The main oil and 
gas infrastructure is located in Rogaland Police district outside of Stavanger. This has resulted 
in exercises that happen more frequently in this area than other police districts. As a result 
some of the companies gets more practice than others due to their location. To strengthen the 
preparedness team during crisis situations in the Barents Sea more practice and exercises 
should be done in this region. By comparing all the exercises that has been conducted through 
the years in the Norwegian Sea, one also sees a need for increasing the number of exercises 
conducted in the Barents Sea. This will be important for the oil companies and the emergency 
response actors they work together during an emergency to be able to acquire knowledge 
about the area and the challenges related to preparedness. 
Summary  
The oil companies set stricter requirements internally, and see a higher risk threat picture then 
the authorities. The oil companies and their preparedness team need to collaborate with the 
authorities to set more realistic and common requirements in relation to combat terrorism. In 
general there is a need of stronger cooperation between the preparedness actors with a clearer 
responsibility distribution within the Norwegian preparedness system.  
The Norwegian practice related to security is still on the preventing phase, and needs to learn 
from other countries that have experience in this field, and work towards security of the 
petroleum industry in a total different way. The Norwegian preparedness system needs to 
learn from other countries and their preparedness system related to their physical protection 
and security culture.  
The request of assistance process needs to be simplified where it takes shorter time before a 
decision is made. During a potential terrorist attack military assistance is highly needed, 
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immediately. Today this process takes too much time and lives can be lost due to how the 
system is designed.  
There is a lack of full-scale exercises in the Barents Sea, involving important actors such as 
the police, the military and external preparedness actors. To strengthen the preparedness team 
during crisis situations in the Barents Sea more practice and exercises should be done in this 
region. We also see a need for increasing the number of exercises conducted in the Barents 
Sea.  
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5.3 A complex and turbulent environment and the preparedness team 
The preparedness respond time in the Barents Sea should be at least as good as on the rest of 
the NCS. Related to security of installations in the Barents Sea the preparedness system faces 
challenges related to resources and infrastructure. Long distance to shore, few vessels and 
helicopter in the area characterise the lack of some resources that are needed during a crisis 
situation (Petroleumtilsynet, 2013 (2)).The infrastructure in the Barents Sea is not built to 
transport the needed assistant and resources within a qualified timeframe, as the case of a 
terror attack on an installation.  
Comparing the preparedness system in the Barents Sea and further south on the NCS, we see 
that there are several areas that oil companies meet great challenges related to preparedness 
during crisis situations. Bellow is an overview of those areas within the Barents Sea that are 
not meeting the preparedness standards to handle crisis situations in the Barents Sea.  
Figure 16 - Comparing the Norwegian Sea/North Sea with the Barents Sea 
Sea area on the NCS /  
Influential factors on the 
preparedness level 
The Norwegian Sea and 
North Sea 
The Barents Sea 
1. Geographical area Small Large 
2. Experience and knowledge High Low 
3. Preparedness resources 
available 
Many Few 
4. Oil companies preparedness 
system 
Strong Weak 
5. Distances  Short Long 
6. Preparedness time Inside recommended 
timeframe 
Outside recommended 
timeframe 
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1. The Barents Sea stretches over a larger geographical area than the Norwegian Sea and 
North Sea. It is challenging to secure large geographical areas as the Barents Sea, where the 
distances for assistant and collaboration are highly spread in a complex and harsh 
environment.  
2. The oil companies needs knowledge and experience to meet the challenges related to 
resources and lack of infrastructure during a terrorist attack in the Barents Sea region. The 
Barents Sea differs from part of Norway due to long distance to other regions and the national 
preparedness resources. The managerial roles within the preparedness team needs to 
strengthen their knowledge of the regions characteristics, vulnerabilities, capabilities, 
expertise, technology and operational management. Those who know the region are familiar 
with the lack of capacity and availability of resources, and can better respond to a crisis 
situation (Jacobsen, 2012).  
3. There is a lack of emergency response resources in the area to handle a terrorist attack, 
compared to the rest of the NCS. Lack of infrastructure, logistic solutions and access to 
resources during a crisis situation on an oil installation in the Barents Sea can lead to 
tremendous consequences (Okstad, 2012). There are few available airports with proper 
capacity. These airports are important contributors to the flow of resources in the petroleum 
industry in the Barents Sea. There are no filling stations for helicopter in the Barents Sea, 
which is needed if the helicopters are going to operate over their limit, which will be the case 
in the northern parts of the Barents Sea (PTIL, 2014a). Few helicopter resources in the 
Barents Sea makes the oil and gas companies more dependent on vessels. But there are also a 
shortage of appropriately equipped vessels that may be called on for assistance during a terror 
attack (Ims, 2013). There will be struggles to rescue, transport and provide medical treatment 
to 80-140 people working on an offshore oil installation in the Barents Sea (Jacobsen, 2012). 
Many companies are now teaming up sharing resources, but there are challenges related to the 
long distances between the operators sharing resources and a limited number of emergency 
equipment if several attacks take place at once on different installations. There is a need for 
evaluation of the preparedness resources that are present in Barents Sea related to the 
increased activity and responsibility. This requires a strong collaboration and interaction 
between operators, authorities and local participants.  
4. The petroleum industry has not established or planned to build a main 2nd preparedness 
team located in the Finnmark region that uses local expertise and knowledge on how to 
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handle terror threats and other crises in the Barents Sea. Today the oil companies have a 
support line located in the Finnmark region, while main 2nd preparedness team is located 
further south on the NCS. The 2nd line preparedness system spread over a larger geographical 
area where the preparedness team are not gathered in one location could cause collaboration 
and communication challenges. The preparedness system is already highly spread, with 
several actors and participants. Rather then establishing support lines we suggested that a full 
2nd preparedness team is established in the Finnmark region that are able to handle crisis 
situations in the Barents Sea with support from the 2nd line further south.  
5. In the Barents Sea there are long distances between shore and offshore, between the 
operating oil companies and their installations, and there are larger distances between 
preparedness participants in the Finnmark region. Getting from shore to the offshore 
installations is a much longer and difficult process than in the southern regions. The 
petroleum activities further south are located much closer where the distance to assistant each 
other during crises situations are much shorter than in the Barents Sea. There are also less 
standby vessels and supply vessels in the Barents Sea assisting during crisis situations 
comparing to areas that have a higher level of petroleum activities. Complex environments 
require interaction and dependency between participants. The participants are dependent on 
sharing resources and information to meet the challenges of the complex environment (Njå, 
1998). Also the distances onshore are larger in the Finnmark region compared to the rest of 
Norway. Making the collaboration process between preparedness participants more 
challenging.  
6. Response time is the time from the attack happens, until the forces are inserted. The 
respond time will depend on the distance to the accident site, the time it takes for the 
preparedness actors to be ready and how quickly they get notice from the oil companies 
(Ulriksen, 2013). In a crisis situation the response time is longer in the Barents Sea, compared 
to the rest of the NCS. This is mainly due to all the above-mentioned factors, making the 
process much more challenging than further south. Today there is a lack of awareness of how 
long this responds time is in the Barents Sea, since national resources used during a terrorist 
attack need to be approved before they can be used against civilians. There is a need for 
exercises to test the response time from national preparedness resources to reach oil 
installations in the Barents Sea in case of a terrorist attack.  
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Summary 
We see a lack of evidence on how the oil companies are prepared to handle terror situations in 
the Barents Sea. The preparedness system and its teams are primarily based on the 
infrastructure and resources located further south on the NCS. There is a lack of knowledge 
and experience from the Barents Sea in terms of available resources and possibilities for 
improvement in the infrastructure. The managerial roles within the preparedness team needs 
to strengthen their knowledge of the regions characteristics, vulnerabilities, capabilities, 
expertise, technology and operational management  
There is a need for more helicopter resources, airports to transport resources from and filling 
stations from helicopters. The lack of helicopter resources make the preparedness team more 
dependent on vessels in the Barents Sea, but there are also a need of appropriately equipped 
vessels that can assistance during a terror attack. The oil companies are teaming up to meet 
these challenges, but the resource allocation can be difficult if more actors are dependent on 
them at the same time. There is a need for stronger collaboration and interaction between 
operators, authorities and local participants to solve the challenges related resources in the 
Barents Sea.   
There should be established a stronger 2nd preparedness team in the Finnmark region that have 
expertise and knowledge in how to handle crisis situations in the Barents Sea. Since the 
preparedness team are located further from the rest of the preparedness team they are 
dependent on a higher and more specialised competence.  
To handle the challenges related to the Barents Sea region the oil company and other 
preparedness actors should collaborate on finding new solutions of safeguarding their 
offshore installations.  
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5.4 Terror threats and different types of terrorist and the preparedness team 
Oil and gas installations in the Barents Sea are potential terrorism threat goals, due to their 
economical importance and international relations. Norwegian oil companies have little 
experience with terror attacks and may have difficulties in understanding the risk related to 
these threats due to its remoteness. The terror attack In Amenas and the 22nd of July at Utøya 
have made oil and gas companies realize that terrorism can happen to their facilities in 
Norway. Even though Norway is a low risk country related to terrorism, the petroleum 
industry needs to prepare for the worst.  
The petroleum companies have done improvements in their preparedness management 
system, recruiting more employees with security experience and competence from the police, 
military etc. In addition new common security organizational systems and frameworks are 
established. Some oil and gas companies have taken this further by applying their own terror 
threat assessments and collecting information from external actors in addition to the annual 
threat assessment from PST. The oil and gas companies have mainly done changes related to 
single events that have shown weaknesses within their existing security system (Brusdal, 
Statoil, 2014). Terrorism is political, economical and socially motivated, where attacks are 
performed in various ways with different methods, intentions and goals (Bråten 2013). It 
seems like PST and the oil and gas companies emphasize different influential factors 
assessing the terror threat picture. It is difficult for the oil companies to predict how the terror 
threat picture will change over time. Single events are an important influential factor for the 
oil and gas companies. Both events indirectly and directly influencing the organization or the 
industry are important factors when preparing for terror threats and strengthening their 
preparedness system. The PST does not focus on single events, but rather look at general 
trends as the main factor forming the terror threat picture. These differences may be reason 
enough for oil companies to evaluate the assessment done by PST, as not being good enough 
for covering the terror threats against the petroleum industry and their installations.  
There are also disagreements between the Ministry of Petroleum and energy (OED) and the 
oil and gas companies related to the importance of protecting petroleum installations against 
terror threats (Helgesen, 2013). These different terror threat evaluations also give another 
reason for oil and gas companies to do their own terror threat assessments. In addition it will 
be difficult to have a trustworthy relationship creating good collaboration, when the 
authorities and the oil companies disagree at a high level. A possibility would be to include 
Master	  thesis	  –	  Master	  of	  Sciences	  in	  Energy	  Management	  	  Bodø,	  2014	  
 
Bodø Graduate School of Business  
 
93 
managers of the preparedness team to take part in common terror threat evaluations with PST. 
The oil and gas companies have valuable experience and knowledge about the influences of 
single events on their preparedness systems. They are capable of describing weaknesses 
within their own preparedness system, which could be simple terror targets.  
There are constantly changing factors influencing the risk level of the threat situation. The 
preparedness team needs to be updated on these changes to create realistic scenarios to 
exercise on (Johansen, 1994). These development trends are provided through PSTs terror 
threat assessments. PST does not assess threats related to specific sectors or actors. It would 
be an option for PST and the oil and companies to collaborate on assessing the terror threats 
against petroleum installations. On the other hand PST provides the petroleum sector and its 
actors with security consulting where they help oil and gas companies to secure them against 
specific terror challenges and condition within the sector. This collaboration would increase 
the security awareness within the oil companies and increase their competence related to 
terror threats. The preparedness team needs to have the right knowledge and capacity to take 
the right decisions (Aarset, 2014a). The increased awareness and knowledge within the 
organization will also increase the terror threat expertise within the preparedness team.  
The ability to handle a terrorist attack depends on the response time (Ulriksen, 2013). Terror 
attacks have taken form in many ways, a trend that is increasing shown in the coordinated 
multiple raids of attacks. For the preparedness team to be prepared for attacks like these they 
need to efficiently reallocate their available security forces. In addition there are limited 
resources that force the preparedness team under in a stressful situation to allocate their 
resources between the attacked installations. The Barents Sea already lacks necessary 
resources related to preparedness and the preparedness team will struggle to assist several 
attacks with its resources. In addition the Barents Sea is an area expecting longer response 
time due to its distances and harsh environment. Terrorists tend to coordinate multiple raids of 
attacks, where the diversionary attack is designed to divert the attention of the larger attack. 
The preparedness management will then use longer time to respond and the terrorists will get 
the chance to do even more harm (Wu, 2009). If multiple raids of attacks take place, where 
the terrorists hit either both onshore and offshore facilitation, or they attack two installations 
at the same place it will create even more time lag. This makes the terrorists capable of doing 
even more harm and increases their chances of succeeding with their terror goals.  
 
Master	  thesis	  –	  Master	  of	  Sciences	  in	  Energy	  Management	  	  Bodø,	  2014	  
 
Bodø Graduate School of Business  
 
94 
Practice of different terror scenarios are a key element to maintain a high security level 
(Parfomak, 2007). The practice of terror threat scenarios held by the petroleum companies is 
prioritized on the same level as other DSHA scenarios. There are 17 DSHA, where new 
exercises are held every 14th day. It would be difficult to cover different terror threats and 
terrorists within this framework. For the petroleum companies and their preparedness team to 
be prepared for terror threats they need to practice on several more terror threat scenarios. The 
data collection shows that the challenges related to a terrorist attack in complex environments 
require more practice and experience than other DSHA. Some petroleum companies have 
chosen to exclude the threat of terror in their strategy mainly due to its unpredictability. It is 
also argued that since the Police have the overall responsibility during a terror situation, they 
are the ones with the strategic plans on how to solve the terror threat situation. It is important 
that the preparedness team is prepared and able to handle the situation until the police have 
reached the installation. Related to terror and the Barents Sea this process takes longer time 
than in other situations, dependent on the distance from the installations to the national 
resources and their ability to reach the accident place.  
These terror threat scenarios are also based on the terrorists’ probability and capacity. Those 
actors with the highest probability and capacity poses the greatest threat (Johansen, 1994). 
Since the terror threat situation is constantly changing and is highly complex due to its many 
influential factors, it might be wrong to focus more on those scenarios with a higher 
probability and capacity, since these can quickly change and where new scenarios can expose 
a bigger threats than those first expected. Petroleum companies need to be prepared for the 
unexpected and by prioritizing exercise both those scenarios that are more likely and less 
likely to take place. 
It is important that the preparedness team understands patterns of behaviour and evaluates 
forthcoming patterns of different terrorists. Combs suggests (2013) that different terrorists can 
be divided into three categories: crusaders, craziest and criminals. For the preparedness team 
to take the right decisions dealing with terrorists they need to have information and 
knowledge about who the terrorists are. As mentioned the petroleum companies work on 
identifying terrorists based on their intentions and capacity to evaluate what types of attacks 
they are capable of performing. In addition it would be relevant to know their level of 
negotiation willingness and their expectation of survival. A manager also function as a 
negotiator which is an integrated part throughout the whole managerial work process 
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(Mintzberg, 1989). Even though the police are the one negotiating with the terrorists, it is 
important that the managers within the preparedness team are familiar with the terrorists’ 
willingness to compromise or if their goal is to do as much harm as possible with the 
willingness to die. This will give them a better understanding of the situation and what type of 
terrorists they are facing. Not always is the terrorist’s intention, goals and motives clear, 
where the terrorist is seen as emotional and physiological unstable. Here it will be difficult for 
the preparedness team to handle the situation if they have no practice or experience dealing 
with psychologically unstable terrorists acting unpredictable both in terms of goals and 
actions.  
Greenpeace has several times through peaceful demonstrations shown how easy it is to enter 
oil and gas installations. Now that oil and gas companies are moving further north on the 
NCS, with a more vulnerable environment, the activity level from environmental activists 
might increase. Activists might approach installations with different, new strategies of 
obtaining publicity to promote their environmental goals. Today environmental activists such 
as Greenpeace do not expose a threat, due to their peaceful demonstrations. They do not have 
intentions to harm people or installations, where they often only seek publicity, while a 
terrorist has an aim to create fear, harm people and installations. Oil and gas companies 
operating in the Norwegian Barents Sea does not see activists as a threat against their people 
and installations. So far the petroleum companies have handled the situations peacefully and 
discretely. However Norwegian oil companies have been naïve related to the terror threats 
facing their installations, and this can be reflected through how they handle activists. 
Comparing Norway and Russia related to how they handle environmental activists shows 
large differences. Where Russians operating in the Russian Barents Sea sees the 
demonstrations from activists as a threat to their installations and people. In the future there 
might be common installation and infrastructure stretching between the Norwegian and 
Russia border in the Barents Sea. There might be activists wishing to harm Russian petroleum 
activity attacking common installations and infrastructure. It also might be activists who seek 
to carry through peaceful demonstrations that unintentionally cause harm to the installation 
and people. Russia’s aggressively approach to handling activists might cause physical harm of 
the activists, where activists might be provoked to act aggressive back.  
Related to the physical security of the installations, they should be protected against activists, 
not because activists intentionally seek to harm anyone, but because there might occur 
Master	  thesis	  –	  Master	  of	  Sciences	  in	  Energy	  Management	  	  Bodø,	  2014	  
 
Bodø Graduate School of Business  
 
96 
unintentional accidents and damages. Demonstrating how easy it is to enter installations can 
give inspiration to people who seek to harm people and the installations. A strong physical 
protection of the installations will protect the installation against all types of intruders, 
regardless of what their intentions are. The petroleum companies are able to still have a 
peaceful approach dealing with the activists, only now it will be more difficult for them to 
enter their installations. Below is a suggestion of those actors petroleum companies need to 
protect their installations against:  
 Motive/Goal Willing to Negotiate? How to handle 
the actors  
Crusader Blend of religious 
and political 
causes 
Seldom, betraying then 
a higher cause 
Full emergency 
response  
Criminal Personal gain Usually, in return for 
profit 
Full emergency 
response 
Crazy Clear only to the 
terrorist 
Possible, only if the 
terrorist understands 
the cause 
Full emergency 
response  
Activist  Environmental 
causes 
Highly possible, if the 
activist gets their cause 
proven 
Handle in a 
peaceful manner, 
guiding them 
away from the 
installation 
Figure 17 - Actors petroleum companies need to protect their installations against 
The best way to improve security in an organization is to change the organizational culture 
(NOU, 2000:24). The organizational culture will have a great influence on how organization 
handle crisis situations (Bråten, 2013). The organizational culture is related to how the 
members of the preparedness team thinks and their attitudes, which will affect their way to 
react during a crisis situation. It is easier for people to understand, see early warning signs and 
solve a situation if they share the same understanding of the threat. The Norwegian culture is 
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presently naive in terms of realizing the potential threat of terror against the nation and its 
people. Oil and gas companies state that it would be difficult for terrorists to reach 
installations in the Barents Sea and see it as unlikely that terrorists would attack installations 
in such harsh environments. These attitudes will affect and influence the rest of the 
organizations security culture. The lack of awareness of potential threats makes personnel and 
other actors less conscious in the way they act in everyday situations. Statoil states that 
security is everyone’s responsibility and to improve the security there needs to be a change 
within the organizational culture. Oil and gas companies have built a strong safety culture 
within their organizations, while the importance of security has been left out and not 
prioritized on the same level (Jerre, DNV-GL, 2014). The terror attacks of the 22nd of July 
and In Amenas they have increased the awareness of terror attacks and identified that that the 
security within the petroleum companies needs to be strengthened. There are several steps and 
areas that need to improve to lift the overall security culture within the organization. To take 
this decision the manger needs to know all possible alternatives, the consequences of each 
alternative, be prepared for these consequences and compare the consequences and to 
determine which one to choose (Turpin, 2004). One way of increasing the security awareness 
is to employ a managerial role with security expertise within the preparedness team. Today 
there are no roles within the preparedness team that are specialized in security. There are 
specific roles focusing on safety such as environmental issues as oil spills. A similar role 
within security and terror attacks should be established within the team.  
  
Summary  
The assessments done by the PST are good enough to cover the terror threats against the 
petroleum industry. There is a need for more internal assessment within the companies, more 
cooperation with PST and also look at the possibility to hire more external actors with 
experience in the field.  
There are disagreements and differences in how the petroleum companies, PST and OED 
consider the terror threat against petroleum installations and which influential factors that are 
emphasized the most. A better collaboration between these actors is needed to build a strong 
security culture, and it is necessary with good training and exercises on potential terror threat 
scenarios.  
 
Master	  thesis	  –	  Master	  of	  Sciences	  in	  Energy	  Management	  	  Bodø,	  2014	  
 
Bodø Graduate School of Business  
 
98 
It is important that the preparedness team is prepared and able to handle the situation until the 
police have reached the installation. For the petroleum companies and their preparedness team 
to be prepared for terror threats they need to practice on several more terror threat scenarios. 
Petroleum companies also need to be prepared for the unexpected and by prioritizing exercise 
both those scenarios that are more likely and less likely to take place. 
The oil installations should be physical secured to protected against activists, not because 
activists intentionally seek to harm anyone, but because there might occur unintentional 
accidents and damages. A strong physical protection of the installations will protect the 
installation against all types of intruders, regardless of what their intentions are.  
There is a need for a change in the organizational culture due to terrorism. The lack of 
awareness of potential threats makes personnel and other actors less conscious in the way they 
act in everyday situations. There are several steps and areas that need to improve to lift the 
overall security culture within the organization. One way of increasing the security awareness 
is to employ a managerial with security expertise within the preparedness team. 
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6.0 Conclusion  
Oil and gas installations in the Barents Sea are potential terror threat goals due to their 
economical, national and international importance. These installations should therefore be 
protected through a strong security and preparedness system. The petroleum companies, their 
2nd line preparedness team and the national preparedness system should be structured and 
organized in new ways to meet the threat of terror in the Barents Sea. In this study we have 
examined how four different variables influence the oil company and their 2nd line 
preparedness team ability to prepare for terror threats in the Barents Sea. The study concludes 
that changes should be done internally within the oil companies and their 2nd line 
preparedness team, and externally within the national preparedness system to strengthen the 
preparedness system.  
For oil companies to be prepared for terror threat in the Barents Sea they should strengthen 
their 2nd line preparedness team in the Finnmark region assisting the 1st line preparedness 
team for oil installations in the Barents Sea. Some oil companies have already established 
these procedures while others plan to establish a 2nd line preparedness team in the Finnmark 
region, functioning as a supportive line to the main 2nd line located in either Stavanger or 
Bergen. This 2nd line preparedness should include more roles covering expertise and 
knowledge within terrorism and local knowledge about the Barents Sea. Having a managerial 
role within the 2nd preparedness line who is specialised in how to handle different terrorists 
and terror attacks will strengthen the teams ability to make good decisions that assist the 1st 
line. This expertise covers knowledge about different terrorists, attack methods, capacity and 
probability, their desire to negotiate and survive and what solutions that is suited to handle 
these different scenarios.  
Increased competence and expertise within terrorism and the Barents region will give the 2nd 
line preparedness team more responsibility areas during a crisis situation. To be able to assist 
the 1st line in the best possible way, the focus within the 2nd preparedness team should be 
mainly on what happens out on the platforms. It would therefore be recommended that some 
of the preparedness roles that mainly assist procedures onshore could be outsourced. We here 
refer to next-of-kin and media services that compromise the communication with the public. 
This outsourcing should not be on the expenses of the organizations reputation and credibility, 
and this might not be the optimal solution related to other regions and crisis situations.  
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Internally the preparedness teams practice and train each 14th day on potential crisis 
situations. Including both individually and common exercises between the preparedness 
teams. Preparing for terror threats in the Barents Sea consist of a much more comprehensive 
collaboration process, with several more actors sharing information and resources within a 
larger geographical area. Preparing for these crisis situations the preparedness teams need to 
perform more full-scale exercises in the Barents Sea. This includes practices with all potential 
participants during a terror attack, such as the military, local actors such as the coast guard, 
standby vessels, helicopter services and rescue coordination centres. Since there is a lack of 
emergency equipment such as helicopters and standby vessels designed to handle terror 
threats, the oil companies should practice on resource allocation and coordination when they 
are exposed to terror threats. If possible, the petroleum companies should also participate in 
terror exercises held by other international petroleum industries that are highly exposed and 
experienced on terror threats such as UK and USA. The petroleum companies should invite 
international forces, such as police and military, that can contribute with valuable assessments 
of the full-scale exercises in the Barents Sea.  
The full-scale exercises should practice on different terrorists attacks, methods and strategies. 
Both where the terrorists attack and approach the installations by boat and helicopter. There 
should be exercises related to internal terrorists as unfaithful personnel or cooperation 
partners, and external terrorists outside the petroleum industry. Different exercises must be 
performed related to the terrorist’s different goals, motivations and negotiation willingness. 
Also the oil company needs to test their capacity to handle different types of terrorist’s 
attacks, including the ability to respond to simultaneous terror attacks performed by the same 
terrorists. 
After the 22nd of July and the In Amenas terror attacks, the oil companies have lifted their 
physical security of their onshore facilities such as refineries, Snøhvit LNG plant and 
petroleum offices. The petroleum companies have invested largely in satellite systems 
monitoring the area. These monitoring systems are able to capture intruders, such as terrorists, 
approaching the installations. This gives the petroleum companies the opportunity to respond 
quickly to the crisis situation. Further north in the Barents Sea the satellite capacity is weak 
and needs to be improved. Related to other physical security measures of oil installations such 
as armed forces and fences, they have not reached the same level as those areas mentioned 
above. Petroleum companies should increase their physical security of oil and gas 
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installations by having armed forces protecting the installations, physical barriers such as 
fences to hinder potential threats and intruders from boarding and harming the installations 
and the personnel. Increased physical security will reduce the capacity and probability for 
terrorists succeeding with their attacks as the installations would become less attractive terror 
goal. If terrorists despite this decide to attack the installation, there would be difficulties of 
doing the same harm within the same timeframe due to the physical armed forces and fences. 
This gives the preparedness system more time to handle the crisis situation. In addition the 
physical security would make it impossible for peaceful environmental activists to board the 
platform.  
For the oil companies to implement these suggested physical securities, the authorities needs 
to share the same view of what physical securities should be in place to prevent and prepare 
terror attacks. This is related to how the threat picture is perceived and understood by the oil 
companies and the authorities. Today the petroleum companies set stricter requirements 
related to some areas within security than the authorities. It is suggested that they work 
towards a shared risk threat picture.  
When opening new petroleum activities in the Barents Sea the oil companies should conduct 
new assessments related to the terror threat level in the region. Moving further north in the 
Barents Sea the petroleum companies needs to be aware of new threats such as activists 
approaching more aggressively. In addition these new installations will be nearer to boarders 
to other countries introducing new risks related to new enemies. 
The petroleum companies needs to increase the preparedness resources in the Barents Sea. 
This includes helicopter, filling stations, airports, crisis equipped vessels. These resources 
needs to be located closer to the installations in terms of reaching the attacked installation 
within a representative time, to save lives and prevent damages.  
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6.1 Further recommendations  
This thesis addresses the preparedness challenges in the Barents Sea where we focus on 
terrorism preparedness. There are areas we mention in this study that provide the basis for 
more exploration.   
There are different phases of preparedness, where we focus on the prevention and preparing 
phase of terrorist attacks in the Barents Sea. Another area that provides a basis for further 
research is how early the oil companies can discover the potential attacks. This would be 
related to technical measures from the companies in terms of physical security and also 
related to monitoring.  
The response time the police and the national preparedness actors use to reach offshore 
installations in the area is a big challenge. There is a need for new assessments of how "the 
request for assistance" system can be more effective. Some improvements have been made in 
this area, but we see the need for new assessment when oil activities are moving even further 
north. 
The further north within the Barents Sea and Arctic region the more challenging it becomes 
for the petroleum industry to have the necessary preparedness resources available and should 
be allocated. There is a need for more research on how the local resources and local actors can 
contribute and assist the oil companies with resources during crisis situations in the Barents 
Sea. Another important area is to look at how the Coast Guard can assist the oil companies in 
areas where they lack equipment and vessels to handle crisis situations. 
We see today an increased development in the factors that influence the terror threat picture in 
Norway related to offshore installations. There is a need for more evaluation related to how 
the strategic choices the oil companies' take may affect their exposure to potential terrorist 
attacks. It will also be necessary for the oil companies and other industries to evaluate which 
potential factors, such as collaboration with new countries, can affect the terror threat level in 
Norway in the future.  
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8.0 Appendix 
Appendix 1 – Interview with the oil companies   
Vi studerer siste året ”Energy Management” og skriver for tiden masteroppgave innen for olje 
og gass sektoren. Vi har valgt å fokuser på lederrollene som kreves i 
beredskapsorganisasjonen ved et eventuelt terroraksjon på plattformer i Barentshavet.  
Vi ønsker også å se på utfordringene ved den økte aktiviteten i Barentshavet og da spesielt 
knyttet mot at selskaper går stadig lengre nord. Vi vil undersøke hvordan den endringer i 
trusselbildet og krav fra myndighetene påvirker hvordan oljeselskapene tilrettelegger for sin 
beredskapsorganisasjon.  
Først av alt lurer vi på om vi kan ta opp intervjuet for bruk i vår oppgave, og om vi da kan 
henvise til deg i teksten. Vi sender da over teksten til godkjenning før noe blir publisert, og 
hvis du har eventuelle spørsmål må du bare ta kontakt.  
 
Om deltakeren 
1. Kan du gi en kort presentasjon av deg seg? (Bakgrunn, arbeidsoppgaver i bedriften, 
tidligere erfaringer, etc.) 
Beredskap  
2. Hvordan er oppbyggingen av kriseberedskapsorganisasjonen (tegne figur) 
• 1 linje beredskap - På oljeplattformen 
• 2 linje beredskap - Den regionale beredskapsorganisasjon,  for eksempel 
Hammerfest 
• 3 linje beredskap - Ved hovedkvarteret i Norge 
 
3. Hva er oljeselskapene sine oppgaver under en krisesituasjon på en av deres 
plattformer på den norske sokkel? 
• Hvem er det som varsler dere? 
• Hvordan ser selve hierarkiet ut under en terroraksjon i forhold til andre 
krisesituasjoner? 
 
4. Hvordan jobber kriseteamet med andre aktører internt og eksternt før en 
krisesituasjon?  
• Hvordan ser samarbeidet ut under en krisesituasjon? 
Ledelsesroller 
5. Hvordan forandrer roller og struktur av rollene seg fra før en krise tar sted til 
selve krisen inntreffer?  
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6. Hvem inngår i et kriseteam på en oljeplattform offshore?  
• Hvor mange personer utgjør et kriseteam? 
• Hva er de forskjellige rollene? 
• Hvordan utfyller rollene hverandre?  
 
7. Hva kreves av kompetanse og personlige egenskaper for de som inngår i et 
ledelsesteam under en krisesituasjon? 
• Hvilke kompetanse og kapasitet kreves for å forhindre en krisesituasjon? 
 
Barents Havet 
8. Mener du oljeselskapene har det som skal til for å operere sikkert i Barents 
Havet? 
•  Vil det være noen utfordringer du ser på som større enn andre i Barnets 
Havet?  
• Hvilke utfordringer ser dere i utvikling av beredskapssystemer tilpasset for 
Arktiske operasjoner? 
Øvelser  
9. Hvordan og hvem velger ut scenarios for øvelsene og treningene?  
• Når dere velger ut scenarios, hvordan prioriterer dere tidligere kriser og angrep 
i forhold til framtidige angrep og kriser som kan ta sted?  
 
10. Hvordan vurderer dere øvelsene som er gjennomført og hvordan gjør dere 
eventuelle endringer/forbedringer? 
 
11. Hvilke øvelser har det vært knyttet mot krisesituasjoner og tilsiktede hendelser 
på norsk sokkel? 
• Øver dere på krisesituasjoner med ansatte på plattformer? 
• Skjer denne øvingen med kun dere som organisasjon eller som samarbeid 
mellom flere aktører? 
• Har du noen oversikt over hvilke øvelser skal dere gjennomføre i 2014 og 
2015 knyttet opp mot denne problemstillingen? 
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Terror 
12. Hva er de svake og sterke sidene av dagens beredskapssystemer relatert til 
oljeplattformer? 
·      Vil disse beredskapssystemene møte nye utfordringer når petroleumsaktiviteten 
flyttes stadig lengre nord? 
·      Hvilke områder må dere omstille dere på/endre for å møte utfordringene i 
Barentshavet kontra lengre sør?   
 
13. Hvordan vurderer dere trusselbildet når det gjelder faren for terror på norsk 
sokkel? 
• Tror du dette vil endre seg fremover? 
•  Er det spesielle områder dere fokuserer mer på? 
• Er det noen terrorangrep eller terrorister dere ser på som en større trussel enn 
andre? 
14. Hvordan blir terrorangrep prioritert i forhold til andre DFU med tanke på 
forebygging og forberedelse av ett potensielt angrep?  
 
15. Hvordan vurderer og tilrettelegger dere for forskjellige type terrorangrep og 
terrorister i øvelsene og treningen? 
 
16. Hvordan arbeider dere daglig for å forhindre eventuelle terrorangrep på 
oljeplattformer?  
Annet  
17. Hvilke rapporter og analyser tenker du kan være viktig for vår oppgave å se på?  
 
18. Hvem vil du anbefale oss å snakke med når det gjelder andre ressurspersoner?  
 
  
Master	  thesis	  –	  Master	  of	  Sciences	  in	  Energy	  Management	  	  Bodø,	  2014	  
 
Bodø Graduate School of Business  
 
112 
Appendix 2 – Interview with external actors and the authority  
Intro samme som intervju med oljeselskapene  
Om deltakeren 
1. Kan du gi en kort presentasjon av deg seg? (Bakgrunn, arbeidsoppgaver i bedriften, 
tidligere erfaringer, etc.) 
 
Samarbeid og koordinasjon 
2. Hvordan samarbeider myndigheten med oljeselskaper på norsk sokkel?  
• Hvordan kommuniserer dere? 
• Hvordan ser erfaring og kunnskapsdelingen ut? 
• Hvordan følger dere opp oljeselskapene når det gjelder 
beredskapsorganisasjon? 
 
3. Har dere en felles arena hvor dere utveksler informasjon og data med 
petroleumsselskapene?  
 
4. Hvordan arbeider dere for å utarbeide rammeverkene for hvordan 
krisesituasjoner på plattformer skal forhindres og håndteres?  
 
5. Hvilken tiltak har blitt endret innen HMS og beredskap etter hendelser som 22 
Juli og In Amenas?  
 
Barentshavet 
6. Hvordan setter dere krav til selskaper som opererer i Barentshavet kontra andre 
områder på den norsk sokkelen?  
• Hvor mye tar dere hensyn til oljeselskapenes forslag til eventuelle endringer?  
 
7. Hvordan møter dere utfordringene knyttet til økt aktivitet stadig lengre nord i 
Barentshavet, med tanke på infrastruktur, kommunikasjon, avstand til land og 
annet?  
 
8. Hvordan har risikonivået i norsk petroleumsvirksomhet utviklet seg de siste 
årene?  
Master	  thesis	  –	  Master	  of	  Sciences	  in	  Energy	  Management	  	  Bodø,	  2014	  
 
Bodø Graduate School of Business  
 
113 
• Hvordan beregner dere dette risikonivået? 
• Hva har størst påvirkning på at risikonivået endres?  
9. Mener du at oljeselskapene har det som skal på plass for å operere sikkert i 
Barentshavet?  
 
Terror 
10. Hvordan vurderer dere trusselbildet fremover i forhold til terror på 
oljeplattformer?  
 
11. Hvordan vurderer og tilrettelegger dere for forskjellige type terrorangrep og 
terrorister; hvor terroristenes mål, kapasitet og metoder kan variere?  
 
12. Hvilke krav stiller dere til plattformsjefer og personer som er en del av 
kriseteamet offshore i Norge?  
 
13. Hvordan øves det på terror på norsk sokkel? Hvem deltar? 
 
14. Hvilke andre offentlige myndigheter samarbeider en med i forhold til terror 
bekjempelse? 
 
Annet  
15. Hvilke rapporter og analyser ser dere som viktig at vi studerer? 
 
16. Hvem vil du anbefale oss å snakke med når det gjelder andre ressurspersoner? 
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Appendix 3 – Interview participants  
Name Position Company Place Interview 
type 
Date Time 
Per Jacob 
Solhaug 
Ass. Cheif of 
Police  
Police liaison Officer 
to the Norwegian Joint 
headquarters  
Bodø Face-to-face 18.02.14 13.00-14.00 
Liv Nielsen HSEQ 
Manager 
ENI Norge  Bodø Face-to-face 20.02.14 16.30-17.15 
Lill Harriet 
Brusdal 
Manager 
safety and 
sustainability 
Statoil  Bodø Face-to-face 19.03.14 12.30-13.30 
Anthoni 
Larsen 
Senior advisor PSA (Ptil) Stavang
er 
Face-to-face 25.03.14 11.30-12.30 
Ellen 
Waldeland 
HSEQ Advisor ENI Norge  Stavang
er 
Face-to-face 25.03.14 14.00-15.30 
Gunn 
Stabell 
Team leader 
safety and 
sustainability 
Statoil  Bodø Phone 27.03.14 10.00-11.00 
Jon Jerre Associate 
Director Oil 
and Gas Sector 
DNV-GL  Høvik Face-to-face 10.04.14 14.00-15.30 
Kurt 
Andreas 
Skog 
Senior Advisor ACONA Stavang
er 
Face-to-face 11.04.14 10.00-11.30 
Participant 
1&2  
 Statoil   Face-to-face 11.04.14 14.00-15.30 
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Appendix 4 – Map of the Barents Sea, Norwegian Sea and North Sea 
 
 
 
1 http://www.npd.no/Global/Norsk/4-Kart/Sokkelkart2013/Sokkelkartet-2013.pdf  
 
